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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Children, as well as adults, are continually asked to explain the 
behaviors of other people. However, it cannot be assumed that the 
processes by which adults and children interpret behavioral information 
are the same. The present study was designed to gain greater under-
standing of these differences in the processing or assessment of behav-
ioral information. 
The specific purposes of the present study are twofold. First, the 
differential use of behavioral information in inferring dispositions by 
individuals operating at different cognitive levels was examined. That 
is, it was determined whether individuals at different cognitive levels 
use behavioral information in the same manner to make attributions of 
personality characteristics. Secondly, this research determined whether 
individuals at different levels of cognitive development used the past 
behaviors of an actor in deciding whether or not that actor was respon-
sible for, and intended to produce, the actions in question. For 
example, subjects initially told that an actor performed three actions 
were asked whether or not they believed that the actor performed a 
subsequent action which was ambiguous with respect to the identity of 
the performer. If a subject believed that the actor did perform that 
action, he or she was questioned on whether the action was performed 
intentionally or unintentionally. 
Both the attributions of dispositions and the explanations of 
responsibility and intentionality may be considered parallel processes 
1 
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to person perception. Specifically, information must first be assessed 
to determine the degree to which it is reflective of the person's inten-
tions. Past research appears inadequate in answering these issues be-
cause of different variations in the information presented. That is, 
some studies make conclusions based upon more than behavioral informa-
tion; and other·studies present a severely limited amount of information. 
The present paper reviews these problems and proposes a new approach in 
researching these questions. Employing the attributional model of 
Kelley (1967), it is hypothesized that limitations imposed by earlier 
stages of cognitive development will influence an observer's assessment 
of behavioral information. More specifically, it is expected that chil-
dren functioning at a preoperational level (2-7 years) of cognitive de-
velopment will not have learned to expect invariances or inconsistencies 
in an individual's behaviors. The consistency or inconsistency within a 
"set" of behavioral information will, therefore, not be a factor in the 
formation of the child's impressions of others. This may influence the 
child's capacity to infer the intentions underlying behaviors, conse-
quently affecting both attributions of dispositions and interpretations 
of responsibility and intentionality underlying subsequent ambiguous 
actions. In contrast, individuals cognitively operating on concrete 
(7-12 years) and formal (over 12 years) levels will have learned to expect 
invariances in the behaviors of others. Thus, the consistency or incon-
sistency of.the "set" of behavioral information will differentially 
affect the interpretations of intentions and subsequent dispositional 
attributions and explanations of responsibility and intentionality under-
lying ambiguous actions. 
Piaget's perspective of the child's moral judgments 
3 
With the publication of Piaget's (1932) work, The moral develop-
ment of the child, impetus was given to the experimental examination of 
the process of moral judgments regarding transgressions. More recently, 
theorists (e.g., Johnson, 1962; Kohlberg, 1963; Lee, 1968) have supported 
Piaget's central assertion that moral judgments evolve from the child's 
changing levels of cognitive operation. That is, through interaction 
processes between an individual and his environment, the child acquires 
those cognitive structures that determine, for a given developmental 
phase, moral judgments of transgressions or behaviors that are socially 
undesirable. Three phases of cognitive development are of special 
importance to these judgments. 
The first phase is the "preoperational," which occurs approximately 
between the ages of two and seven years. The pervasive characteristic 
of this phase is that of "egocentrism," which means the child's thoughts 
are centered on his own point of view, and thus the child is unable to 
conceive of the world from other people's perspectives. Gradually the 
child relinquishes this egocentric perspective and begins to realize 
that his perceptions of a situation may be different from reality. This 
is the phase of "concrete operations" which emerges during the seventh 
year and terminates during the ages of approximately eleven or twelve. 
During the succeeding "formal operations" phase, the child can consider 
possible events in addition to actual ones. He is able not only to 
think of actual relations, but also becomes capable of viewing events 
and relationships that might occur. 
Piaget asserts that preoperational children base their moral judg-
ments on the obj e.:..-ivc= c...,;1sequences of ... ~ _ .1sgressions, as opposed to 
concrete children who examine the intentions of the transgressor. For 
example, Hebble (1971), using Piaget's story technique, varied both the 
consequences of an act and the behavioral intentions of the actor. The 
hypotheses were confirmed that the children operating at the preopera-
tional level based their judgments primarily on the consequences of the 
act and largely ignored the intentions of the transgressor. Children 
operating at the concrete level rated the actor as less "naughty" than 
did the preoperational children when the intentions were good, regard-
less of the consequences of the act. Hebble concluded that children -
operating at the concrete level have the ability to assess intention-
ality when making moral judgments. Children operating at the preoper-
ational level, however, have not developed this capacity.! 
A "Piagetian" perspective might ·explain this inability of preoper-
ational children to take account of an actor's intentions, as resulting 
from the child's highly centered logic. The child can only attend to 
one aspect or dimension· of a situation at one time. In the same manner 
that preoperational children cannot simultaneously focus on both height 
and width in order to conserve volume, they cannot "decenter" away from 
the objective consequences of an action to permit assessment of the 
actor's intentions. 
Other theorists' perspectives of the child's moral judgments 
There appears to be little in Piaget's theory of cognition that 
would seem to require that children focus on the consequences, as 
opposed to the intentions, in making moral judgments if the intentions 
of an actor and the consequences of his or her actions are clearly made 
salient. Thus, Piaget's perspective has been challenged by other re-
searchers on grounds that the supporting experimental result may be an 
4 
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artifact of the mode of stimulus presentation or a product of particular 
socialization techniques. 
Chandler, Greenspan, and Batenboim (1973) reported comparison of 
films and story media that suggest that preoperational children, having 
viewed films, can use subjective factors (i.e., intentions) in making 
moral judgments. However, other children of the same age continue to use 
objective consequences when the incidents are verbally presented as 
stories. The authors' interpretation was that the verbally presented 
stimulus materials inadvertently highlighted the perceptual saliency of 
the consequences of an action for the preoperational children they studied. 
A medium in which the intentions and consequences are presented as more 
balanced might permit children to display their awareness of and compe-
tence in assessing intentionality. 
Research by Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, and Farnil (1973) has similarly 
found that children operating at a preoperational level can take account 
of an actor's intentions if the behavioral consequences of the actions 
are positive or beneficial to others. The authors explained these re-
sults as a product of the child's socialization processes. Adult models 
may be responding more to the behaviors than to the intentions of the 
child when the consequences of the child's actions are undesirable or 
negatively valued. That is, most children may receive negative feedback, 
either directly or indirectly, from socializing agents when they produce 
negative outcomes regardless of their intentions. As an example, when 
a child breaks a window a parent may admonish the child whether the 
action was accidental or purposeful. However, if a child's actions are 
positive or beneficial t.:.. others, the parent :,.., .ess likely to reward 
these actions if they were performed accidentally rather than intention-
6 
ally. Children may then learn to discriminate intentionality more slowly 
for negative actions than positive events. According to Constanzo et al., 
this results in a developmental lag in social attribution behavior for 
the two kinds of circumstances. 
Both of these studies (i.e., Chandler et al., and Costanzo et al.) 
seem to indicate that children operating at a preoperational level of 
cognitive development can recognize the importance of intentions to 
moral judgments in some situations. Situations that do not artifically 
enhance the salience of the behavioral consequences, or those situations 
that reduce the salience of parental sanctions may facilitate the per-
ceptions of intentionality and subsequent moral judgments. 
The child's ability to make inferences about intentions 
The question of whether children are able to perceive intentions 
and use this information in making moral judgments is important, for it 
may be a crucial aspect of the ability to infer personal dispositions. 
That is, an actor's behaviors are usually not interpreted as indicative 
of some underlying dispositional trait unless the actions are perceived 
as voluntary. Involuntary or accidental behaviors communicate little to 
observers about actors' dispositions (Shaver, 1975). Thus, ·in the same 
way an observer takes account of intentionality before making moral 
judgments concerning transgressions, the observer must also consider 
intentionality before making inferences about an actor's dispositions. 
For example, if John strikes all of his friends, the extent to which we 
can say that John is "angry" or "bad" is largely determined by whether 
we have seen those transgressions as intentional. Further, the dispo-
sitions inferred are only useful in explaining subsequent behaviors that 
are ambiguous with respect to intentionality if the.dispositions have 
been based on behaviors that have been intentionally enacted. If John 
has broken some dishes, the degree to which we can explain this action 
as "purposeful" or "accidental" is dependent upon the interpretation 
of the prior behavioral information. 2 
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This last point is of methodological interest since past studies 
examining children's moral judgments have typically provided behavioral 
information directly reflective of the intentions underlying the very 
act the child is asked to judge. It is not actually kriown if young 
children can explain ambiguous behaviors. That is, it is not known 
whether they can interpret the intentions underlying an ambiguous action 
as either "accidental" or "purposeful." Further, if children can "ex-
plain" these behaviors, it is unclear what information enables them to 
do so. In other wards, previous research seems to indicate a link 
between knowledge of intentions and subsequent moral judgments. It is 
yet to be determined how the characteristics of the information, reflec-
tive of the underlying intentions of an actor, affect subsequent explan-
ations of intentionality underlying ambiguous behaviors. Further, past 
research focusing on moral judgments has typically provided stories 
that describe only one behavior that was intentionally or accidentally 
produced. More information reflective of the intentions may make the 
intentions of the actor more salient, thus facilitating inferences of 
dispositions and explanations of ambiguous behaviors. For example, if 
John strikes other people on a number of separate occasions, it might 
be easier to infer that "something" about John accounted for that be-
havior, than if John had only struck one person. That is, if a behavior 
only occurs once, it may have been caused by some characteristic of the 
actor or some situational element that "forced" the actor to behave in 
a given way. The more times a given behavior occurs in a variety of 
situations, the more confident we become that the action was intention-
ally performed by the actor. Further, it might be easier to explain 
intentionality and responsibility underlying an ambiguous behavior if 
more than one unit of behavioral information is presented.3 
8 
An observer's inferences of dispositions and his explanations of an 
actor's ambiguous behaviors may both depend on some sampling of the 
information that is available to him, both from his own present exper-
iences and from other social sources. Judgments of intent in these 
situations may then parallel dispositional judgments. That is, both are 
problems of person perception. Just as we can assess behavioral infor-
mation to determine an individual's traits, attitudes, and abilities, we 
can also examine this information in order to infer intentions. 
Person perception of children 
Some researchers have already suggested an affinity between the 
processes of moral judgments and those used in making inferences about 
others. Specifically, just as age and cognitive development correlate 
positively with consideration of intention in the child's moral judg-
ments, so too, with age and cognitive development, children become more 
complex and more systematic in making attributions about others. For 
example, Gollins (1958) found that older children are better able to 
integrate varied information about a person than younger children. The 
paradigm used involved assessment of sequentially filmed scenes depict-
ing a child behaving in socially desirable manners followed by socially 
undesirable behaviors. Subjects were asked what they thought of the 
subject and what they had seen him do. Responses were scored according 
to whether or not they used inferences and concepts in their reports. 
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An "inference" was credited to the subject if he attempted to go beyond 
the information presented and described some underlying motive or situ-
ation that accounted for one of the actions in the film. Subjects were 
credited with a "concept" if they attempted to relate and integrate con-
flicting features in the other person's behavior. Results showed an 
increase with age in the use of both "inferences" and "concepts," in-
dicating that the ability to relate and organize information about other 
people follows a developmental sequence. 
Another indication of developmental changes in person perception 
is provided by Livesley and Bromley (1973). They asked subjects of 
various ages to describe eight people known to them; a man, woman, boy, 
and girl they liked, and a man, woman, boy, and girl they disliked. For 
the purpose of a content analysis, the descriptions were divided into 
"units." Each unit was a statement or idea defined as one item of 
information referring directly or indirectly to the other person. Ex-
perimenters then assigned these units to one of two types of statements--
central or peripheral. Central statements included references to per-
sonal qualities and general habits. Peripheral statements referred to 
appearance, identity (e.g., age, sex, residence), social roles, posses-
sions, details of family, and so on. Results indicated that older 
children (8-9 years) used more central statements in their descriptions 
than younger children (6--7 years). This change in strategy in impress-
ion formation between the ages of seven and eight years was interpreted 
by Lives ley and Bromley as resulting from the chi::..~·~-. ::·'-~---·:;uishment o:f 
egocentrism. As he becomes capable of inferential thought, he integrates 
events separated in time, and finds underlying regularities, similari-
ities, and consistencies in the other's behavior. 
10 
The implication of both these studies seems to be that as children 
become older, they more readily and accurately draw inferences about 
personality dispositions of others. It is still unclear, however, how 
behavioral information will be used in determining dispositions and 
explaining ambiguous behaviors. In the strictest sense, Gollin's re-
search (as well as Chandler et al.) did not completely answer this 
question, since it did not deal solely with behavioral information. The 
use of films or videotapes communicates not only behavioral information 
but also affective components, such as facial expressions. Although 
both behavioral and affective elements are important, since they are 
salient in our everyday interactions, this confounding prevents the 
determination of whether children can use behavioral information alone 
in explaining intentions and determining personal dispositions. 
Kelley's attribution theory 
Kelley's (1967) attribution theory is relevant to these questions 
since it concerns the processes by which the typical observer infers a 
person's motivations from his actions. Essentially, the theory is based 
on the principle of covariation between causes and effects. An effect 
or behavior is attributed to one of the possible causes with which it 
covaries over time. To the extent that an action is observed as dis-
tinct to an individual, consistently performed by that individual over 
time~ and is not being done by others in that situation, an observer can 
confidently make a dispositional attribution to the actor (as opposed 
to the action being a product of the stimulus or circumstance). Kelley 
11 
conceptualizes this model as a three-dimensional cube in which the ob-
server is thought to arrive at his or her attributions by applying the 
principle of covariation along each of the following three dimensions. 
1. The "time/modality" dimension refers to the "consistency" with 
which an action is performed. Confidence in dispositional attributions 
necessitates tha.t an actor's response to a· stimulus be perceived as 
consistent across time and across the varying modes of interaction the 
actor may have with the stimulus. For example, we might feel more cer-
tain that it was "something about John" if John consistently strikes 
Tim everytime they encounter each other, as opposed to this action being 
only a one-time occurrence. 
2. Kelley's "entity" dimension represents whatever object is under 
attributional consideration at the time. When the object of perception 
is another person, that person falls along this dimension. Whether or 
not a response is unique to one entity determines the "distinctiveness" 
of the information. High distinctiveness of behaviors across several 
entities or actors lends support to a dispositional attribution to the 
actor. If only John hits Tim, and none of the other children do so, 
this further substantiates that it must be "something about John." 
3. The "persons" dimension is that from which "consensus" informa-
tion is obtained. That is, whether or not the same attributions are 
made by other observers in the situation. High consensus among observ-
ers that a personal attribution is warranted, faci1itates a disposition-
al attribution by any one of the observers. If'all observers agree 
that John is a "bad boy," we are further convinced that John's aggressive 
actions had something to do with the way "John is," and not a prr"'""ct 
of any unique stimulus or circumstance. 
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To the extent that an individual's observations meet these criteria, 
he or she can feel confident that a "person attribution" is warranted. 
Of course, many times all of this information is not available, and we 
must make tentative judgments by basing our attributions on the best 
estimates we have of the unobserved dimensions. A complement of this 
situation is when we have the information available, but fail to con-
sider it fully as a result of attributional biases. 
Attributional biases of children 
Kelley delineates a number of errors adults may make when attempting 
to attribute an action to the situation or to the person. Although 
Kelley does not specifically state it, children may also be susceptible 
to these or other attributional errors. Further, it might be expected 
that the child's cognitive level of operation may affect the probability 
of making some of these errors. It is not my intent to demonstrate that 
children are making any one kind of error in their attributional pro-
cesses, but to show that limitations resulting from a child's cognitive 
level of operation may have a predictable impact on his or her assessment 
of behavioral information. 
Kelley, for example, postulates that one possible error might be the 
ignoring of the relevant situation. This suggests a tendency to attach 
too much significance to the behavior and too little to the situational 
context. In terms of making attributions about dispositions, this might 
indicate a difficulty in taking account of situational circumstances. 
For example, John may be labeled as a "bad boy" if he strikes Tim, even 
if that action was in self-defense. 
This ability to consider the situation may be of particular impor-
13 
tance when the observer is presented with seemingly ~nconsistent behav-
ioral information about an actor. The capacity to make a dispositional 
attribution to the actor may be dependent on resolving the perceived 
inconsistencies of the actions. If John is typically kind to other 
children yet hits Tim~ this inconsistency may be "explained" as result-
ing from Tim's provocation or. other situational factors that may have 
"forced" John to take physical actions. 
Of course~ whether an inconsistent action is perceived as inconsis-
tent largely depends on whether we have learned to expect invariance in 
behaviors and actions. Much in the same way that we learn that physical 
properties are invariant (e.g., that a quantity of a substance is not 
altered by its shape), we may also learn that there are constant and 
invariant features in human behavior and personality. For example, if 
John is a "good boy" we expect him to consistently perform good acts. 
If John does strike someone, he will still be perceived as a "good boy," 
if that action results from situational circumstances. 
It is not until the concrete operation phase of development that 
children begin to understand this principle of "invariance." Thus, a 
series of inconsistent behaviors may not be perceived as "inconsistent" 
to the child operating at the earlier preoperational phase of develop-
ment. Accordingly, the tendency to attribute an action that is incon-
sistent with the majority of actions to the situation in order to infer 
"meaningful dispositions" is not present in the preoperational child. 
The child operating at the preoperational level does not base his or 
her impressions on the consistency of the information as a "set." Rather, 
as the information changes, so will the child's impressions of the actor. 
Another possible source of attributional error Kel1eymentions stems 
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from the magnitude of the affective consequences of an action. The 
"goodness" or "badness" of a behavior, independent of the intentions, 
has an impact on the attributional process. For example, Walster (1966) 
presented evidence that the worse the consequences of an accidental 
event, the greater is the tendency to assign responsibility to the per-
son causing it. Young children operating at the preoperational level 
may be particularly susceptible to this error, since the inability to 
decenter causes the child to focus on one isolated dimension of a sit-
uation. The result may be a failure to employ behavioral information 
relevant to a correct interpretation of any action. That is, one that 
is ambiguous with respect to whether the actor is responsible for the 
action and whether the actor's performance was "purposeful" or "acciden-
tal." 
Of course, it should not be assumed that both "good" and "bad" 
behaviors will be equally affected by this error, for they may be seen 
from qualitatively different perspectives. As previously cited, 
Costanzo~ al., have indicated that children can more easily draw in-
ferences from "good" behaviors as a result of socialization techniques 
and consequent learning. Accordingly, it is possible that children more 
easily infer dispositions from the observed action when the behaviors 
are positive and use this information in the determination of the re-
sponsibility for and the intentionality underlying an ambiguous act. 
KelJeymentions other attributional errors, but those already 
reviewed may be particularly relevant to the attributional processes of 
children, since they so closely parallel the child's cognitive develop-
ment. F::::-c:;: this :---- - - • - · -_, the abili :-- ' assess behavioral informa-
tion and its subsequent impact on judgments of ambiguous behaviors and 
inferred dispositions may be examined as an increasing adeptness at 
making attributions. 
Attributions based on variations across the "time/modality" dimension 
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Although the attribution process can involve the determination of 
covariation along all of the three previously mentioned dimensions, each 
can also be examined separately. Furthermore, examination of variations 
along only one dimension facilitates the determination of what attrib~­
tional difficulties may occur for children. This unidimensional focus 
opens any research to the criticism that the attributional processes 
involving all three dimensions are qualitatively different from that of 
any single dimension. However, in many social situations information 
is limited, yet we still can make attributions. For example, Orvis, 
Cunningham, and Kelley(l975) empirically found that 52% of their sub-
jects felt they could confidently make an attribution to the circumstances 
when given information about an actor that was low in consistency. In-
formation that was perceived as high in consistency was typically 
attributed to either the actor (24% of the subjects) or some interaction 
between the actor and the stimulus (48% of the subjects). 
In the present study, I have chosen not to present to subjects any 
information pertaining to the "persons" and "entity" dimension&, but 
rather I have focused exclusively on how children perceive covariations 
along the "time/modalities" dimension. That is, emphasis will be placed 
on how dispositional attributions and explanations of ambiguous behav-
iors are made on the basis of the observation of consistencies or in-
consistencies in an actor's behaviors over a series of episodes. 
Consistency across modalities as it affects inferences of dispositions 
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and explanations of ambiguous behaviors 
To confidently make a dispositional attribution to an actor respond-
ing to stimuli necessitates that the actor's behaviors be consistent 
across these stimuli. For example, a sequence of actions in which the 
actor is consistently responding to stimuli in a socially approved manner 
may be sufficient information to justify a dispositional attribution of 
"good boy." A series of behaviors representing socially disapproved 
responses may elicit; an attribution of "bad boy." This behavioral irr-
formation may also be useful in interpreting actions that are ambiguous 
with respect to the identity and intentions of the actor. For example, 
adults and children, who have mastered the concept of invariance, may 
label an individual as not responsible for behaviors that have resulted 
in physical damage, if the preceding behaviors of that actor have been 
positive or socially desirable. That is, a person who has consistently 
performed "good" behaviors would not be thought to suddenly alter his 
behavior by engaging in actions that result in negative consequences. 
Of course, this assumes that the observer has perceived those prior 
actions as intentional and not the product of unique circumstances. 
Similarly, this same action that has resulted in undesirable consequences 
may be labeled as "performed by the actor," if the preceding behaviors 
of that actor have been negative or socially undesirable. Further, this 
action may be perceived as "intentional" or "done on purpose" if the 
actor's earlier negative behaviors were seen as intentional. In summary, 
the consistently "good" or "bad" behaviors have made salient the inten-
tions underlying an actor's behavior, making possible both dispositional 
attributions and subsequent pvnl ::>n<>H 011s of ambigum•c behaviors. 
Whether or not children operating on a preoperational level will be 
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able to make dispositional attributions to the actor when given a se-
quence of behavioral information is unclear. Research by Morrison and 
Mancuso (1974) indicates that young preoperational children can use 
behavioral information in determining whether the actor "has .it in him" 
to enact future "good" or "bad" behaviors. This might indicate that 
these children have some capacity to infer dispositions. However, a 
cautious application of this interpretation should be made to our own 
research, since Morrison and Mancuso employed videotapes to present tbe 
actor's behaviors. This may have made more than behavioral information 
salient (e.g., information pertaining to affect, such as the actor's 
facial expressions). If Costanzo et al. are correct in their assertion 
that, for preoperational children, positive behaviors are more reflec-
tive of intentions than negative actions, then it might be predicted 
that these children could make dispositional attributions when the 
behavioral information is positive or socially desirable. For example, 
the dispositional ratings should be more polarized toward the "good" 
end of any scale than dispositions based on negative information are 
polarized toward the "bad." Further, this behavioral information may 
also determine whether ambiguous actions are attributed to the actor 
and, if so, the underlying intentions. If a child observes positive 
behaviors, he or she may not only perceive the actor as a "good" person 
with "good" intentions, but also perceive that actor as not performing 
actions that have resulted in negative consequences~ Conversely, ob-
servers may attribute responsibility to the actor if the consequences 
are positive. Further, these positive consequences of-the behaviors 
may 1--·~ en as an intentional product of the actor's actions. If 
negative behaviors are observed, not only will the child have difficulty 
r 
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in inferring dispositions, but the child may also fail to attribute 
responsibility and intentionality to actors of ambiguous actions. That 
is, preoperational children will not consistently attribute actions or 
intentions to consistently "negative" actors when presented with ambig-
uous actions that have either positive or negative consequences. 
Inconsistency across modalities as it affects inferences of dispositions 
and explanations of ambiguous actions 
Following Kel1ey'sattributional model, it might also be of thea-
retical interest to determine the effects of inconsistent behaviors on 
dispositional attributions (e.g., two positive acts followed by a nega-
tive act). It might be hypothesized that any inconsistency would make 
dispositional attributions difficult for subjects who have learned to 
expect·invariances in others' behaviors, that is, subjects who are at 
the concrete and formal phases of cognitive development. The reason for 
this difficulty is that the informational "set" is low in consistency. 
Thus, there may be a tendency to attribute all behaviors to situational 
circumstances. However, if the observer is "forced" to make a disposi-
tiona! attribution, he must first "explain" or "discount" the inconsis-
tency. One way of resolving the inconsistency may be to attribute the 
least consistent behavior within the set to situational constraints or 
some property of the stimulus to which the actor is responding. For 
this reason, a minimum of three behaviors must necessarily be employed 
to establish .the "inconsistency" of one of the actions within the set. 
For example, presenting only two behaviors, one positive the other 
negative, makes attributions difficult since either behavior may be 
reflective of the actor's dispositions or the unique situation. When 
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three behaviors are presented (e.g., two negative and one positive), 
attributional processes are simplified. The inconsistent behavior within 
the set might be attributed to situational constraints, and the consis-
tent information within the set might be attributed to the actor's 
disposition. At this point it should be mentioned that the ordering 
of behaviors within the set may be an important. consideration. That is, 
whether the consistent or inconsistent information within a set comes 
first or last in the sequence may effect attributions. To check for 
these "primacy" and "recency" effects it will then be necessary to 
counterbalance the order of information within inconsistent sets. For 
example, a set consisting of two negative behaviors followed by a posi-
tive would be counterbalanced with a set consisting of a positive be-
havior followed by two negatives.4 
Of course, it is difficult to determine whether an observer is 
actually resolving the inconsistency within the information set by mak-
ing situational attributions, or whether he is merely assigning it a 
"weight" consistent with the impression formed from the other information. 
That is, the observer may not totally disregard the piece of inconsis-
tent information, but merely "weight" it as less indicative of the 
actor's disposition than the more similar pieces of information. In 
either situation, it might be predicted that adults and children oper-
ating on a concrete level will make more evaluatively polarized (i.e., 
extreme) dispositional ratings when the information is consistent as 
opposed to inconsistent. Of course, these latter results would also be 
predicted by a simple averaging model (Anderson, 1965). That is, dis-
pc-~.;.,_.;'1nal judgments may be predicted by the "average" value of the 
behaviors on the dimension of judgment. 
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Children operating at a preoperational level of cognitive develop-
ment may fail to perceive inconsistent behavioral information as a "set" 
when making dispositional attributions. Accordingly, if dispositional 
attributions are made, they will not necessarily be based on the infor-
mation that is most consistent within the set. Rather, dispositional 
attributions will probably be based on the most temporally recent piece 
of behavioral information. This tendency is a result of the child's 
inability to decenter and the consequent focusing on only one dimension 
of a situation. Affective responses being prominent in the child, this 
inability to decenter results in impressions that are either strongly 
negative or positive. That is, preoperational children will make dis-
positional attributions that are highly polarized, independent of the 
evaluative desirability of those behaviors preceeding the final action 
of the actor. Changes in the actor's behaviors do not lead to consid-
erations of how consistent the new behavior is with previous actions. 
Instead, the child's entire impression of the actor changes because the 
child's narrow focus of interest shifts. 5 
Furthermore, whether any behavioral information is used in making 
dispositional judgments may depend on the evaluative desirability of the 
final action. Preoperational children may have learned to perceive 
positive behaviors as reflective of the intentions of the actor earlier 
than negative actions. Thus, positive information may then facilitate 
dispositional attributions. Specifically, dispositional ratings may be 
more polarized when the temporally recent piece of behavioral informa-
tion presented is socially desirable as opposed to undesirable. 
In terms of the ability to assign respor,.:..~v~..:....:.. ... > C:i!d intentiom .. .c.._ ... y 
to ambiguous behaviors, adults and children operating at a concrete 
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l evel will pr obably base their explanation on the behavioral information 
that is most consistent within the set. For example, if John hit Tim 
and then kicked Fred and then shared his lunch with Bob, it might be 
easiest to discount the third action by assigning it relatively lesser 
"weight" than the preceeding actions, or attributing the last behavior 
to situation constraints. As a "set" the three pieces of information 
are still inconsistent, making any type of personal attributions 
difficult. But, if "forced" to determine whether an ambiguous action-
was produced by the actor and whether it was intentional or unintention-
al, the subject, who has learned to look for invariances in behaviors, 
may more likely see the inconsistent behavior within the set as reflec-
tive of some thing other than dispositional attributes. In the above 
example, John may have shared his lunch wi th Bob because his mother told 
him to do so. Thus, John is still a "bad boy" because this action was 
externally motivated. If subsequent ambiguous actions occur that have 
either positive or negative consequences, we might expect that John 
performed the actions that had negative consequences but not those that 
had positive consequences. Intentionally produced negative consequences 
are more "invariant" with prior negative actions. 
Children operating at the preoperational level will probably not 
perceive the inconsistent behavioral information as a "set" of actions 
r eflective of the actor's dispositions. Thus, the child will not 
"average" t he i nformation or try to "resolve" the inconsistencies with-
in the set by discounting the inconsistent piece of information. Rather, 
the child' s impressions will probably be based on the most temporally 
E information. When the latter information within a set 
is positive, attributions of intentionality may more easily be made, 
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facilitating dispositional judgments. Furthermore, if the most tempor-
ally recent behavior is positive, this information may influence explan-
ations of subsequent behaviors that are ambiguous with respect to the 
identity and intentionality of the actor. That is, if a subsequent 
action has positive consequences, the preoperational child may assign 
responsibility for this action·to the actor. Specifically, it is pre-
dicted that preoperational children will be able to "decenter" from the 
positive consequences of an action to consider the preceding behavioral 
information. If the preceding actions have terminated in a positive 
manner, this may facilitate attributions of responsibility and inten-
tionality to the actor. Sets of behaviors that have terminated in 
negative manners make difficult attributions of dispositions and inten-
tions. Thus, preoperational children may have difficulty "explaining" 
subsequent ambiguous actions. ~fuen the ambiguous actions have negative 
consequences, attributions of responsibility and intentionality may be 
even more difficult since the preoperational child may have trouble 
"decentering" from the consequences of these actions.6 
In summary, the ability to make dispositional attributions and the 
ability to explain ambiguous behaviors may be viewed as parallel pro-
cesses of person perception. That is, behavioral information must be 
assessed to determine whether it is reflective of the actor's intentions. 
Behaviors that are consistent tend to reflect these intentions, facili-
tating both dispositional attributions and interpretations of subsequent 
ambiguous behaviors. In addition, variations in the consistency of this 
information differentially affect individuals at various phases of cog-
nitive development. Individuals at the later phases (i.e., "c-'"'~-:-~e+-'"'" 
and "formal") have learned the principle of invariance and thus are more 
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likely than individuals at the earlier preoperational phases to be 
attuned to the consistency or inconsistency of the "set" of behavioral 
information. These individuals may try to "explain" the inconsistency 
by discounting the more "inconsistent" piece of information within that 
set or by assigning it lesser "weight" than the more consistent pieces 
within the set. In contrast, individuals who have not learned to an-
ticipate invariances in behaviors will alter their impressions of an 
actor as the behaviors change. This failure of preoperational children 
to consider the "set" of behavioral information results in impressions 
being based on the most temporally recent piece of information. Further, 
the social desirability of the behavioral information will influence 
the child's ability to infer intentions and to make dispositional attri-
butions. Explanations of ambiguous behaviors will, accordingly, be 
based on socially desirable information, but only when the consequences 
of the ambiguous actions have been positive. This latter point stems 
from the preoperational child's inability to decenter from actions that 
have negative consequences. 
Past research has failed to adequately investigate these hypotheses 
largely because of methodologies that present more than behavioral in-
formation or show only one action of the actor. Attribution theory in-
dicates that a series of behaviors is necessary in order for an observer 
to make inferences of dispositions confidently and, by the same logic, 
explanations of intentionality. A variation in the number of behaviors 
would provide a test of any effects behavioral information has on the 
formation of impressions by individuals at various levels of cognitive 
dev.,~ the number of actions in a sequence or 
"set" would introduce a "set size" confound (Posavac & McKillip, 1972). 
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Therefore, it is necessary to hold constant the number of behaviors 
presented (a minimum of three). This will permit a manipulation of the 
evaluative consistency of the behaviors within the informational set. 
Variations in the consistency of the information, however, will necess-
itate that measures be taken to counterbalance the order of inconsis-
tency that. may result in primacy and ·recency effects. That is, the order 
of the information within the behavioral sequence may influence the 
attributional processes. Thus, it will be necessary to reverse the 
serial order of all inconsistent sequences to control for these effects. 
Hypotheses and predictions 
The present study is designed to investigate the following 
hypotheses: 
I. Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive de-
velopment will base ratings of behavioral intentionality on the 
evaluative consistency of the "set" of behavioral information. 7 
A. Sets of consistently positive and negative information should 
result in more polarized ratings than inconsistent sets. 
B. Consistently positive and negative sets should result in equally 
polarized ratings. 
II. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development 
will base ratings of behavioral intentionality on the evaluative 
positivity (i.e., amount of positive information) of the behavioral 
information. 
A. Consistently positive information should result in more polarized 
intentionality ratings than consistently negative sets. 
B. Inconsistent sets containing two positive behaviors should result 
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in more polarized ratings than sets containing only one posi-
tive behavior. 
III. Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive de-
velopment will make dispositional and prediction ratings based on 
"sets" of behavioral information that are either consistently 
positive .or negative across modalities. 
A. Sets of positive behavioral information should result in dis-
positional and prediction ratings that are evaluatively positive. 
B. Sets of negative behavioral information should result in dis-
positional and prediction ratings that are evaluatively negative. 
C. Both positive and negative information should result in equally 
polarized dispositional and prediction ratings. 
IV. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive develop-
ment will make dispositional and prediction ratings that are more 
evaluatively polarized when the set of behavioral information is 
consistently positive than when the information is consistently 
negative. 
A. Sets of positive behavioral information should result in ratings 
that are evaluatively positive. 
B. Sets of negative behavioral information should result in dispo-
sitional ratings that are evaluatively neutral. 
V. Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive de-
velopment will make dispositional attributions based on the behavior-
al information that is most consistent within a set; hence, when 
given information that is inconsistent (i.e., both positive and 
negative such as: PPN, NNP), dispositional attributions will tend 
to be based on the evaluatively similar pieces of information. 8 
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A. When the most consistent information within a set is positive 
(i.e., PPN, NPP) evaluatively positive ratings will be made. 
B. When the most consistent information within a set is negative 
(i.e., NNP, PNN), evaluatively negative ratings will be made. 
C. These ratings, however, will be less polarized than when the 
"set" of behavioral information is consistent. 
VI. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive develop-
ment will base dispositional attributions on the most temporally 
recent piece of behavioral information (i.e., the last behavior to 
be presented), when the information presented is inconsistent. 
A. Temporally recent positive behavioral information (i.e., NNP, 
NPP) will result in more positively polarized dispositional 
ratings than temporally recent negative information (i.e., PPN, 
PNN). 
VII. Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive de-
velopment will base explanations of the responsibility for and the 
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on the preceeding sets of 
behavioral information that are either consistently positive or 
negative. 
A. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, 
positive behavioral information should result in these subse-
quent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the actor. 
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional. 
·B. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative, 
positive behavioral information should result in these subse-
quent ambiguous actior"' ~-:-t ,._,_ ~:1 g ascribed r" .. he actor. 
C. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, 
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negative behavioral information should result in these subse-
quent ambiguous actions not being ascribed to the actor. 
D. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative, 
negative behavioral information should result in these subse-
quent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the actor. 
1. These actions of the actor will be rated as intentional. 
VIII. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive develop-
ment will base explanations of the responsibility for and the 
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on only the consistently 
positive information when coupled with positive consequences of the 
ambiguous event. 
A. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, 
positive behavioral information should result in these subse-
quent ambiguous actions being .ascribed to the actor. 
1. These actions of the actor will be rated as intentional. 
IX. Subjects operating at concrete and formal levels of cognitive de-
velopment will base explanations of the responsibility for and the 
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on the preceeding behavioral 
information that is most consistent within the set; hence, when 
given information that is inconsistently both negative and positive, 
ratings will be based on the evaluatively similar pieces of infor-
mation. 
A. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, sets 
consisting of similarly positive behaviors should result in these 
subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the actor. 
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional. 
B. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative, sets 
consisting of similarly positive behaviors should result in 
these subsequent ambiguous actions not being ascribed to the 
actor. 
C. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, 
sets consisting of similarly negative behaviors should result 
in these subsequent ambiguous actions not being ascribed to 
the actor. 
D. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are negative, 
sets consisting of similarly negative behaviors should result 
in these subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to the 
actor. 
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional. 
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X. Subjects operating at a preoperational level of cognitive develop-
ment will base explanations of the responsibility for and the 
intentions underlying ambiguous actions on the most temporally 
recent piece of positive behavioral information when coupled with 
positive consequences. 
A. When the consequences of the ambiguous action are positive, 
temporally recent positive information (i.e., NNP, NPP) should 
result in these subsequent ambiguous actions being ascribed to 
the actor. 
1. These actions of the actor will be seen as intentional. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Eighty-four children and adults, both male and female, from the 
Chicago area served as subjects. Twenty-eight children defined as 
"preoperational" and twenty-eight defined as "concrete" by performances 
on Piagetian tasks individually experienced and responded to seven stim-
ulus conditions. These children were attending schools in the Oak Park 
Elementary School System. Twenty-eight college students, who it was 
assumed were at the "formal" operation level, also served as subjects 
in these same stimulus conditions. These college students were all en-
rolled in Introductory Psychology classes at Loyola University.9 
The children tested to determine the "preoperational" and "concrete" 
levels of cognitive development were approximately six and nine years 
old, respectively. These ages were chosen because they have frequently 
been associated with the preoperational and concrete phases of develop-
ment. 
Piagetian tasks 
Prior to the presentation of the stimulus conditions, the two 
younger groups of subjects were individually tested to determine the 
Piagetian phase of cognitive operation they had achieved. Because the 
principle of invariance may be integral to the processes of dispositional 
attributions, the tasks used were meant to determine the degree to which 
the child saw his or her world as stable and permanent. Specifically, 
the tasks usea determined the degree to which conservation of a contin-
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uous quantity and conservation of a substance was maintained. It then 
is an assumption that mastery of the principle of invariance in physical 
objects applies to the perception of people, (cf., Livesley & Bromley, 1973). 
To determine "conservation of a continuous quantity," the child was 
presented with two identical beakers equally filled with an observable 
substance. The child wa·s then asked whether or not the glasses contained 
the same amount of substance. After he .or she agreed to the equivalence 
of the substances, the experimenter poured the substance from one of the 
beakers into a third dissimilar container. The child was then asked 
whether the new beaker contained the same amount of substance as the 
unaltered beaker. If the subject asserted that it did, he or she was 
asked to explain why. 
The second task, involving the assessment of ''cons~rvation of 
substance" was performed by initially presenting the child with two 
identical balls of clay. After the child was given the chance to exam-
ine the balls, he or she was asked whether they were the same amount of 
clay. If the child did not think so, he or she was given the opportunity 
to add or subtract clay from the balls so they were of equal quantity. 
The experimenter then changed one of the balls to a sausage shape while 
the child watched. The child was then asked whether the ball and sausage 
now contained the same amount of clay. If the child said that they did, 
he or she was again asked to explain why. 
If the child performed consistently at one level across both tasks, 
it was assumed that the child·was operating at that cognitive level. 
That is, the child was classified as "preoperational" if he or she failed 
both tasks, and "concrete" if both tasks were passed. Tl.o !"!?'"':'~"ses of 
the child to the stimulus manipulations .were then included in the final 
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analyses as the operational definition of "level of cognitive develop-
ment." 
Design 
All subjects individually responded to each of seven stimulus 
sequences. Six of the sequences were descriptions of behavioral "sets" 
that portrayed an actor responding to a stimulus in either a consistent-
ly or inconsistently positive or negative manner (see Table 1). The 
seventh stimulus sequence consisted of a set of behaviors that were 
evaluatively neutral with respect to social desirability. That is, these 
latter behaviors had previously been determined by judges to be neither 
socially desirable (i.e., positive) nor socially undesirable (i.e., nega-
tive). Following each sequence, subjects were asked to make intention-
ality and dispositional attributions to the actor. After these attribu-
tions were made, a fourth and final behavior was presented to each sub-
ject that portrayed either positive or negative consequences ensuing from 
actions that were ambiguous with respect to whether the actor had or had 
not performed them and the intentions underlying the behavior. Each 
subject was subsequently asked to make attributions of responsibility and 
intentionality to the actor on the basis of this information and the 
preceeding behavioral sequence. The stimulus sequences were presented 
in a latin-square design to control for any effect resulting from the 
order of their presentation. In addition, the positive and negative 
consequences following each sequence were alternately presented across 
sequences for each subject. Both male and female experimenters were 
responsible for testing the subjects to avoid any confounds stemming 
from sex of subject and sex of experimenter interactions. 
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TABLE 1 
Stimulus Conditions 
Behavioral Sequences Consequences 
Ambiguous Behaviors 
Behavior 1 Behavior 2 Behavior 3 
Positive Positive Positive Positive or Negative 
Negative Negative Negative Positive or Negative 
Positive Positive Negative Positive or Negative 
Negative Negative Positive Positive or Negative 
Negative Positive Positive Positive or Negative 
Positive Negative Negative Positive or Negative 
Neutral Neutral Neutral Positive or Negative 
Note. "Positive" indicates socially desirable behaviors. "Negative" 
indicates socially undesirable behaviors, and "neutral" indicates 
behaviors that are neither socially desirable nor socially undesirable. 
Essentially a two (sex of experimenter) by three (subject's cogni-
tive level of operation) by two (evaluative consequences of the final 
action) by seven (stimulus conditions) fractional factorial design with 
subjects nested within the last two factors was employed. 
Procedure 
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Stimulus conditions. Two stimulus sequences described an actor 
behaving across three scenes in either consistently positive or negative 
manners. Each scene or story was characterized by three different modal-
ities of behavior that were evaluatively consistent. These sequences 
were meant to test the hypotheses of whether subjects at different levels 
of cognitive development made different dispositional attributions and 
prediction ratings. Further these sequences were meant to determine 
whether different cognitive levels would use the prior behavioral infor-
mation in explanations of ambiguous actions. 
The second two sequences described an actor behaving across three 
scenes in an inconsistent manner. That is, the first two scenes depicted 
the actor behaving in a socially desirable or socially undesirable 
manner, followed by a third scene that described a behavior evaluatively 
inconsistent with the previous two. This was meant to determine whether 
subjects systematically resolve the inconsistency in a manner that 
allows the assessment of the actor's dispositions and the explanation 
of ambiguous behaviors. Two sequences were also presented to all sub-
jects that were the reverse of the two sequences described above, that 
is, the first story was inconsistent with the second and third. These 
sequences were necessary to determine any effects due to the ordering 
of the information within a sequence. 
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The seventh sequence described an actor behaving across three scenes 
in evaluatively neutral manners. This might be considered a control se-
quence that tested the effects of non-evaluative information on .attribu-
tions of dispositions and explanations of ambiguous behaviors. 
The seven sequences just described are summarized in Table 1. Al-
though these sequences ·have been described sequentially to permit clarity 
of explanation, the actual stimulus presentations were alternated· to 
control for any effects due to the ordering of the sequences. Further, 
any given positive or negative behavior within a sequence appeared at 
least once in all evaluatively similar positions within both consistent 
and inconsistent sequences. 
Finally, all sequences contained a final ambiguous behavior that the 
subject was asked to explain. That is, the subjects were asked to pre-
dict whether the actor actually performed that action, and, if be did, 
whether it was performed intentionally or unintentionally. 10 
Stimulus tasks. The stimulus items consisted of seven different 
sequences of stories that were individually read to the subjects. Each 
sequence consisted of three separate stories or descriptions of behaviors 
involving an actor of unspecified age behaving in positive, negative or 
neutral manners (see examples in Appendix A). These stories had been 
previously rated by 30 individuals of comparable ages to the subjects to 
determine those behaviors that were low in variability with respect to 
perceived social desirability. That is, behaviors were chosen on the 
basis of whether a given action was rated by individuals as consistently 
socially desirable, undesirable, or neutral. After the sequence of 
stories was read, subjects were questioned on whether they had perceived 
the actor in the preceeding three stories as "really meaning to; sort of 
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the behaviors. Subjects were then questioned to determine the extent to 
which they had made a dispositional attribution to the actor depicted in 
the stories. Measures used in determining whether a dispositional 
attribution had been made were a pictoral rating scale and a behavior 
prediction test (see section on dependent me~sures). 
After the dispositional ratings were made by the subject, a fourth 
story was read that depicted the same actor as associated with, although 
not clearly responsible for, actions that had resulted _in either positive 
or negative sequences (see examples in Appendix D). These final actions 
had been previously rated by individuals of comparable ages to the sub-
jects to determine those behaviors that were low in variability with 
respect to the perceived "severity" of the consequences. After this 
final story was read, subjects were questioned on whether they thought 
the actor actually performed or was responsible for the actions. If the 
subject thought that the actor had performed those actions, the subject 
was ·then questioned on whether the actor "really meant to; sort of meant 
to; sort of did not mean to; or really did not mean to" perform the 
actions. 
Subjects were then asked to recall the behavioral description they 
most remembered and the other stories that had been read. This served 
as a check on whether differences in attributions might be attributed to 
differential attention to the behaviors or the inability to remember 
what behaviors were depicted. These procedures were then repeated with 
the other six stimulus conditions. 
Dependent measures. I1':1l:'.c:Eately after tb"' - :quence of three stories 
was presented and prior to presentation of the story depicting ambiguous 
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behaviors, the subjects were asked whether they thought the actor had 
performed the preceeding behaviors intentionally. That is, whether the 
actor "really meant to; sort of meant to; sort of did not mean to; or 
really did not mean to" perform all of the behaviors within the sequence 
was assessed. To test the extent to which various ages were able to 
infer dispositions from the behavioral information given, two scales 
were alternately given after the subjects were questioned on the inten-
tionality of the actor's behaviors. Recently, Buchanan and Thompson 
(1973) and Costanzo et al., (1973·) have convincingly shown the technical 
advantages of using rating scales in developmental studies of judgments. 
The first scale was a pictoral rating scale developed by the author for 
use with children. This instrument portrays two sets of pictures, hope-
fully, reflecting "good" and "bad" personality characteristics. Each 
set consists of three pictures similar in all respects except in size. 
Once the subject had verbally responded to the actor as either a "good" 
or "bad" boy, the appropriate set of pictures was randomly displayed 
paired with a label that the experimenter verbally presented. For ex-
ample, the three "good boy" pictures in Set I might be presented in order 
of diminishing size and appropriately labeled as "very, very good; good; 
a little bit good." The subject is then asked to point to that picture 
and verbally label how "good" the actor is thought to be. Assigning a 
value to each picture establishes a bipolar six-point scale (see Appen-
dix B). The second dependent measure, revised and shortened by the author, 
was initially developed for a study using children by Morrison and Man-
cuso (1974). This instrument supports Livesley and Bromley's advocacy 
of using Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory as a guide to the 
study of children's person perception. Kelly's main theorem stresses 
, 37 the centrality of prediction in person-construing, which like all con-
rr. 
~ struing provides actors with a repertoire of possible predictions about 
actors. The behavior prediction test, a two-choice, four item stick-
figure test asks the subject to indicate his expectation that the story 
character would typically engage in either a "good" behavior or a "bad" 
behavior in a variety of school and home situations. Children indicate 
their choice by drawing an "X" over the illustrated behavior that they 
expect from the actor in the story (see Appendix C). 
After these scales were administered, the fourth story depicting a 
behavior that has resulted in either positive or negative consequences 
was read to subjects. The subjects were then asked whether the actor 
performed or did not perform the action that led to the consequences. 
That is, the subject might have been asked, for example, "Do you think 
it was John who ran into the table knocking down all of the dishes?" If 
the response was affirmative, the subject was subsequently asked whether 
the actor "really meant to; sort of meant to; sort of did not mean to; 
or really did not mean to" break the dishes. 
Summary. In summary, all subjects were presented with sequences of 
behaviors that were consistently or inconsistently either positive or 
negative. After this presentation, each subject was asked whether he or 
she thought the behaviors were performed intentionally. Two scales were 
then alternately given that were meant to assess the extent to which a 
dispositional attribution had been made. A fourth and final behavior was 
then presented that was ambiguous with respect to whether the actor had 
actually performed the action and the intentions underlying that action. 
This action was characte"'"izec 1-y alternating :'r--:.tive and negative con-
sequences across all stimulus sequences for all subjects. Subjects were 
then asked whether they thought the actor had actually performed the 
actions. If the subject's response was affirmative, he or she was 
further questioned on whether he or she thought the actor intended to . 
produce the consequences. Finally, the subjects were asked to recall 
the behaviors depicted in the initial sequence of behaviors. 11 
38 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Subjects 
Eighty-five children and adults were tested with the experimental 
tasks. Twenty-eight subjects were classified in each of the three levels 
of cognitive development; namely, preoperational, concrete, and formal. 
On the basis of chronological age, one child was hypothesized to be 
operating at a preoperational level of cognitive development, but passed 
both Piagetian tasks indicating that he was operating on a "concrete" 
level. To facilitate statistical analyses, this subject was excluded 
from the data and another child substituted. Mean ages and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 2. Included in this table are the 
mean ages and standard deviations broken down by sex of the subjects. 
Attributed intentionality to the actor's behaviors. A two (sex of 
the experimenter) by three (subject's level of cognitive development) 
by seven (behavioral sequence) analysis of variance with subjects nested 
in the first two factors and repeated across the third was used to analyze 
the four-point scale of perceived intentions. The analysis of variance 
summary table and the means and standard deviations of the intentionality 
ratings for the three levels of cognitive development are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
Main effects for intentionality ratings. No significant differences 
in ratings were found as a function of the sex of the experimenter. The 
main effect of cognitive level of operation was significant, f (2, 78) = 
16.1367, E < .00001. Planned comparisons (WinP~, 1971) between the -
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TABLE 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Age of Subjects 
cognitive level n mean standard deviation 
preoperational 
male 13 77 .}0 3.30 
female 15 79.87 5.28 
both 28 78.86 4.53 
concrete 
male 7 117.57 6.58 
female 21 115.52 7.78 
both 28 116.04 7.44 
formal 
male 10 239.50 37.44 
female 18 236.39 42.50 
both 28 237.50 40.08 
Note. Means and standard deviations are presented by months. 
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TABLE 3 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Intentionality Ratings 
Source MS df F 
Sex of experimenter (A) 2 . 328 1 1.024 
Cognitive level (B) 16.678 2 16.137* 
A x B 1.818 2 .800 
Error (between) 2.273 78 
Behavioral sequence (C) 5.129 6 8.742* 
Ax c .217 6 .370 
B x c .722 12 1.231 
Ax B X C .576 12 .982 
Error' (within) .587 468 
*.E. <.00001 
TABLE 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Broken-down by Cognitive 
Level and Sequencel2 
Cognitive Level Behavioral Sequence 
ppp PPN NPP Neutral NNP PNN NNN 
Preoperational 
mean 1. 785 2.464 2.214 2.464 2.571 2.607 2.429 
standard deviation 1.101 1.071 .957 1.071 1.034 1.100 1. 200 
Concrete 
mean 1. 286 2.179 1.929 1.821 1.929 1. 821 . 1.464 
standard deviation .535 .945 .940 .819 .940 .819 .693 
Formal 
m~an 1.179 1. 750 1.286 1.536 1.857 1.536 1.429 
standard deviation .548 .887 .600 .793 1.044 .838 .742 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("really meant to") to 4 ("really did not mean to"). 
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preoperational ratings and the combined concrete and formal subjects' 
ratings indicated that the younger children judged the intentions of the 
actor over all behaviors as significantly less intentional than the 
judgments made by the two older groups of subjects, F(l, 78) = 4.343, 
E <.04 (see Figures 1 and 2). Specifically, the preoperational children 
tended 'to distribute their ratings across the categories of intentionality 
and the older subjects primarily made ratings of "really mean to" (55.9% 
of responses) and "sort of mean to" (27.8% of responses). These per-
centages are presented in Table 5. This finding indicates that preoper-
ational children less consistently than older subjects attribute inten-
tionality to an actor's behaviors. These results may also be supportive 
of the findings of other researchers that the ability to consider matters 
of intentionality is a relatively late-maturing accomplishment of middle 
childhood (Kohlberg, 1969). That is, theorists have previously hypothe-
sized that preoperational children may have difficulty "decentering" 
from behaviors to consider the actor's intentions. If this logic is 
true, it should not be surprising that younger children attribute in-
tentions on less of a systematic basis than older subjects. 
A main effect for behavioral sequence was also significant, F (6, 
468) = 8.742, E <.00001. Planned comparisons revealed that the sets of 
consistent behaviors (i.e., PPP, NNN) were rated as significantly more 
polarized (i.e., ratings tended to be more towards the "really mean to" 
end of the scale) than sets of inconsistent behaviors (i.e., PPN, NPP, 
NNP, PNN), F (1, 468) = 33.143, £ <.00001. As illustrated in Figures 
1 and 2, evaluatively consistent behaviors across a given sequence led 
to the actions of the actor be'ing rated as more intentional than cval-
uatively inconsistent behaviors. Additionally, consistently positive 
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TABLE 5 
Percentage of Responses in Each Intention~lity Category Broken-down by Cognitive Level 
Intentionality Category Cognitive Level 
Preoperational Concrete Formal All 
"rea 1 ly meant to" 29.6% 45.9% 65.8% 47.1% 
"sort of meant to" 23.0% 34.7% 20.9% 26.2% 
"sort of didn't mean to" 29.1% 15.3% 9.7% 18.0% 
"really didn't mean to" 18.4% 4.1% 3.6% 8.7% 
Note. The chi-square revealed a significant relationship between cognitive level and response 
category, (x2(6) = 89.183, p <.0001). 
r 
.. 
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behaviors tended to be rated as more intentional than consistently nega-
tive behaviors, ~ (83) = 3.23, E <.002. 
Further analyses of the main effect for behavioral sequence disclosed 
no significant differences between inconsistent sets as a function of the 
frequencies of positive and negative behaviors (i.e., PPN and NPP sets 
compared to PNN and NNP sequences) ;, .! ( 83) = 1. 06, .E_ > .10. That is, 
intentionality ratings did not vary as a function of the degree of eval-
uative "positivity" or "negativity" within a set. 
To check for effects of order of information within a set, NNP 
sequences were compared to PNN sets and PPN sequences were contrasted with 
NPP sets.· Employing t-tests, it was found that PNN sets and NNP se-
quences were rated as equally intentional, ~ (83) = 1.16, .E_ >.10. How-
ever, NPP sequences were rated as significantly more intentional than PPN 
sets, .! (83) = 2.33, .E_ <.022. 
Comparing intentionality ratings of the neutral information with the 
combined ratings of the consistent behaviors revealed significantly 
higher or "less intentional" ratings for the neutral information (_! (83) 
= 3.63, .E. <.001). That is, subjects rated the consistent information 
as more intentional than the neutral behaviors. A comparison of ratings 
based on the neutral information with those based on the combined incon-
sistent sets was not significant,~ (83) = .78, .E_ >.10. In summary, 
consistently positive information is rated as more intentional than the 
other sequences. However, before hypotheses are advanced in explanation 
of any of the trends across behavioral sequences, an examination must be 
made of these trends across the three cognitive levels. 
Interaction effects for intentionality ratings. Although the over-
all interaction between the subject's cognitive level of operation and 
the behavioral sequence was not significant (see Table 3), further 
r analyses were made using planned comparisons. 
1·: r These comparisons revealed that both preoperational children and 
grouped concrete and formal subjects rated consistent sets as more in-
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tentional than inconsistent sets (F (1, 468) = 7.72, E <.01, F (1, 468) 
= 38.879, E <.001, respectively). This finding is supportive of hypoth-
esis IA that older subjects base their ratings of intentionality on the 
evaluative consistency of the set. Further, it was found that consis: 
tently positive information elicited higher ratings of intentionality 
from combined concrete and formal subjects than the consistently negative 
information, ! (1, 468) = 3.896, E <.05. This result is in contrast to 
hypothesis IB which stated that the older subjects would equally polarize 
ratings based on consistently positive and negative information. However, 
examination of Table 5 indicates that the lower ratings of the· consis-
tently negative sequences was due largely to the older subjects making 
more frequent ratings of "sort of meant to" as opposed to when the be-
haviors were consistently positive. More specifically, the percentages 
of responses in the combined "really meant to" and "sort of meant to" 
categories were similar for both the consistently positive and negative 
sequences (94.6% and 91.1%, respectively). It then appears that the less 
polarized ratings based on the negative information resulted from more 
conservative estimates of intentions and not a failure to attribute 
intentionality. 
Preoperational children also rated the consistently positive se-
quences as more intentional than the consistently negative sequences 
! (1, 468) = 5. 97 3, E <. 05. F ·. ;ever, \vh en presente! ' · th the consistent-
ly negative information, they tended to make more ratings in the cate-
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gories of "sort of did not mean to" and "really did not mean to" than 
when the information was consistently positive. Thus, the percentages 
·- in both the "meant to" categories dropped from 78.5% when consistent 
information was positive to 50.0% when the information was negative. 
When the information is consistently negative, it appears that preopera-
tional children fail to systematically ·attribute intentionality. 
Neither preoperational children nor grouped concrete and formal 
subjects significantly differentiated intentions on the basis of fre-
quency of positive or negative behaviors within an inconsistent set, (F 
(1, 468) = 3.426, ~ <.07,! (1, 468) = .0076, ~ >.10, respectively). 
That is, neither the preoperational subjects nor the combined concrete 
and formal subjects differentiated between grouped PPN and NPP sequences 
as contrasted with the grouped PNN and NNP sequences. However, there 
did appear to be a marginal tendency· for preoperational children to rate 
inconsistent behavioral sets containing two positive behaviors as more 
intentional than sequences containing only one (hypothesis liB). This 
finding plus the earlier stated evidence that consistently positive in-
formation is rated by preoperational children as more intentional than 
consistently negative gives credence to hypothesis II that younger chi!-
dren will base ratings of intentionality on the evaluative positivity of 
the behavioral information. As Costanzo et al. (1974) had earlier 
hypothesized, this may result from parental rearing practices that may 
focus on the intentions of an actor when the consequences arepositive 
or beneficial to others. Thus, preoperational children may more easily 
have learned to attribute intentionality to positive behaviors than nega-
tive actions. These trends in attributions of intentions by cognitive 
levels are illustrated in Figure 2. Preoperational children appear to 
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be basing their ratings on the "positivity" of the behavioral set, and 
concrete and formal subjects seem to base their attributions of inten-
tionality on the "consistency" of the set. 
Planned comparisons were also made to see if preoperational and 
grouped concrete and formal subjects would differentiate between NNP and 
PNN sequences. Neither preoperational children nor combined concrete 
and formal subjects significantly differentiated their ratings on the 
basis of these sets (F (1, 468) = .274, £ >.10, F (1, 468) = 2.9830,-
£ >.10, respectively). However, when comparisons were made between PPN 
and NPP sequences, differences in ratings for the cognitive levels were 
found. That is, combined concrete and formal subjects rated NPP sequences 
as more intentional than PPN sets, F (1, 468) = 6.712, E <.01. In con-
trast, preoperational children did not make a distinction between these 
sets, F (1, 468) = 1.096, .£. >.10. Examining Figure 1 indicates that 
the greatest differences in ratings between the NPP and PPN sets were 
for the formal subjects. This may indicate that older subjects view the 
information in a temporally sequential manner. Specifically, positive 
information coming last in a sequence may be perceived as indicative of 
the actor's present nature and, thus, more intentional. This reasoning 
may similarly explain the marginal tendency for grouped concrete and 
formal subjects to rate PNN sequence as more intentional than NNP sets. 
Across preoperational, concrete, and formal levels of cognitive 
development, neutral behaviors were increasingly rated as more intention-
al. This again reflects a failure of preoperational children to attri-
bute intentions behind actions. Statistically, neither preoperational 
children nor grouped concre~~ anc formal subjectc ~tfferentiated between 
neutral behaviors and combined inconsistent behaviors (F (1, 468) = .2465, 
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r ~ >.10, E (1, 468) = 1.657, ~ >.10, respectively). However, both pre-
operational and grouped concrete and formal subjects did differentiate 
between neutral behaviors and combined consistent behaviors (F (1, 468) 
= 5.844, ~ <.05, F (1, 468) = 5.864, ~ <.05, respectively). This may 
indicate that neutral behaviors are devoid of any elements that would 
·make the consistency of the behaviors salient. That is, neutral behav-
iors are neither evaluatively positive nor negative, thus the consistency 
of the behaviors is difficult to determine. For older subjects, this 
may hinder attributions of intentionality. It might be further argued 
that since neutral behaviors lie somewhere along the middle of the con-
tinuum of "degree of positivity," preoperational children would make 
attributions of intentionality similar to those ratings based on the 
inconsistent information, assuming additivity. 
Further interaction effects for intentionality ratings. No higher 
order interaction effects between the sex of the experimenter, cognitive 
level of operation, or the behavioral sequence were significant. 
An unequal n, two (sex of experimenter) by two (sex of subject) by 
three (cognitive level of operation) analysis of variance was performed 
to check for interactions between the sex of the experimenter and the 
sex of the subject across the three cognitive levels (see Table 6). No 
main effects for the sex of the experimenter or the sex of the subjects 
were significant for ratings of intentionality. Further, no interactions 
occurred between the subject's sex and the sex of the experimenter. There 
was a significant interaction between the experimenter's sex and the 
cognitive level. Examination of Table 7 indicates that this latter in-
teraction was due to the formal subj ::c t 's rating beh~" · trs as more in ten-
tiona! when the experimenter was female as opposed to when the experimen-
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TABLE 6 
Unequal n Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Intentionality Ratings 
Source MS df F 
Sex of Subject (A) .233 1 .271 
Sex of Experimenter (B) 2.149 1 2.499 
Cognitive Level (C) 37.205 2 43.257* 
Ax B .103 1 .120 
A X c .422 2 .491 
B X c 2.569 2 2.986** 
Ax B .X c .094 2 .109 
Error .860 576 
*.E. <.001 
**.E. <.06 
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TABLE 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Broken-down by 
Sex of Experimenter and Sex of Subject 
sex n mean* standard deviation 
Male subject 
Male experimenter 
preoperational 8 2.411 1.156 
concrete 3 1.810 ~680 
formal 5 1.600 .736 
Female experimenter 
preoperational 5 2.229 1. 239 
concrete 4 1.857 1.113 
formal 5 1.257 .561 
Female subject 
Male experimenter 
preoperational 6 2.405 1.149 
concrete 11 1.701 .796 
formal 9 1. 746 1.031 
Female experimenter 
preoperational 9 2.365 .921 
concrete 10 1.814 .856 
formal 9 1.365 .655 
* Mean rating ranged from 1 ("really meant to") to 4 ("really did not 
mean to"). 
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ter was male. 
Summary. In summary, preoperational children do not attribute in-
tentions underlying behaviors as readily as the older concrete and formal 
subjects. In part, this may result from the inability to decenter from 
the actual behaviors depicted in the sequence. Thus, not being attuned 
to the intentionalit'y of the actions, preoperational children typically 
do not focus on the consistency of the behaviors as indicative of the 
actors' intentions. Learning experiences of children, however, facili-
tate the perception of intentions when the behavioral information is 
positive. Thus, sets consisting of more positive behaviors are seen as 
enacted more intentionally than sequences consisting of negative behav-
iors. Finally, it might be concluded that although older subjects appar-
ently base intentionality ratings primarily on the consistency of the 
set, preoperational children tend to base intentions on the evaluative 
positivity of the information within the set. 
Dispositional attributions to the actor. Dispositional ratings 
were m.ade by subjects on "good boy" or ''bad boy" scales, each consisting 
of three points, visually and verbally differentiated by degrees of 
"goodness" or "badness." Taken together, the scales were considered as 
unidimensional and assumed to be of equal interval, varying from the 
lowest rating of "very, very, good" to the highest rating of "very, very, 
bad." This scale was alternately presented with the prediction measure 
immediately following the assessment of intentionality questions. Analy-
sis of the dispositional measure was done using a two (sex of experimen-
ter) by three (subjects' level of cognitive development) by seven (be-
havioral sequence) analysis of variance with subject~ nested within the 
.first two factors and repeated across the third. 
r 
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Main effects for dispositional ratings. No main effects were found 
for the sex of the experimenter or the cognitive level of operation (see 
Table 8). This latter finding is in contrast to the significant differ-
ences in intentionality ratings that were made by the three cognitive 
levels. A main effect for dispositional ratings was found for the be-
havioral sequence, F (6,468) = 71.635, E <.001. This finding is not 
particularly surprising since it merely indicates that subjects were 
using the behavioral information in making their dispositional ratings. 
This same effect for behavioral sequence was found for the intentionality 
ratings. Examination of the means presented in Table 9 indicates that 
subjects "average" the behavioral information in making their disposi-
tional ratings (Anderson, 1965). That is, the "goodness" or "badness" 
of ratings appears to be a function of the frequencies of good and bad 
behaviors within the sequence. Consistently posit.ive or negative se-
quences elicited the most extreme ratings and inconsistent sets were 
rated somewhere between these extremes. Inconsistent sets characterized 
by two positive behaviors (i.e., PPN, NPP) elicited significantly more 
positive attributions than sets characterized by only one positive be-
havior (i.e., PNN, NNP), ~ (83) = 9.04, E <.01. 
To check for effects of order of information within a set, NNP se-
quences were compared to PNN sets and PPN sequences were contrasted with 
NNP sets. It was found that PPN sets elicited ratings equivalent to the 
NNP sequences, ~ (83) = .53, E >.10. However, dispositional ratings 
based on NNP sequences were more positive than the attributions based on 
the PNN sets, ~ (83) = 2.83, E <.006. 
Inte-:- ........ tion effects for dispositional ratings. The only inter-
action found for the dispositional ratings was between cogni-
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TABLE 8 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Dispositional Ratings 
Source MS df F 
Sex of experimenter (A) 1.634 1 .341 
Cognitive level (B) 5.583 2 1.164 
Ax B 9.369 2 1.953 
Error (between) 4.798 78 
Behavioral sequence (C) 103.094 6 71. 635* 
Ax c .321 6 .223 
B x c 4.665 12 ·3. 241** 
AxB XC .990 12 .688 
Error (within) 1.439 468 
* p <.0001 
** p <.01 
TABLE 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Dispositional Ratings Broken-down 
by Cognitive Level and Sequence 
Behavioral Sequence 
:ognitive Level 
PPP PPN NNP Neutral NNP PPN NNN 
Preoperational 
mean 2.143 2.536 3.071 3.107 4.143 4.071 4.214 
standard deviation 1. 779 1.710 1. 762 1.912 1.604 1.804 1. 779 
Concrete 
mean 1.393 3.036 3,107 2.464 3.929 4. 714 5.250 
standard deviation .497 1.290 1.286 1,261 1.514 1.013 1.005 
Formal 
mean 1.464 2.750 2.429 2.143 3.643 4.357 4.857 
standard deviation .962 1.110 .920 1.044 1.129 1.16"2 . 1.380 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 1 ("very, very good") to 6 ("very, very bad"). 
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tive level of operation and behavioral sequence, ! (12, 468) = 3.241, 
~ <.01. Examination of Figures 3 and 4 reveals that concrete and formal 
subjects did base dispositional attributions on the evaluative positivity 
or negativity of the behavioral sets. The combined ratings of the con-
crete and formal subjects, however, were not significantly more polar-
ized than the ratings of the preoperational children, ~ (82) = 1.40, 
£ >.10. That is, deviations from the midpoint of the dispositional 
scale were no more extreme for the preoperational or combined concrete 
and formal subjects. As supportive of hypotheses IliA and IIIb, con-
sistently positive information resulted in evaluatively positive ratings 
and consistently negative behaviors resulted in evaluatively negative 
attributions made by the concrete and formal subjects. Again, these 
ratings based on only consistent information were no more polarized for 
the .combined concrete and formal subjects than for the preoperational 
children, .! (82) = . 30, £ >.10. A t-test revealed that older subjects 
did polarize positive information more toward the positive end of the 
dispositional scale than negative information was polarized toward the 
"very, very bad" end of the continuum,.! (55) = 2.81, ~ <.01 (one tailed). 
This latter finding is non-supportive of hypothesis IIC that predicted 
that older subjects would equally polarize dispositional ratings of 
consistently positive and negative sequences. However, for the majority 
of older subjects both consistently positive and negative sequences did 
produce extreme dispositional ratings. That is, consistently positive 
sequences elicited dispositional attributions of "very, very good" or 
"good" from-all of the concrete subjects and 92.3% of the formal sub-
jects. Consistently negative sequences were rated as "very, very had" 
or "bad" by 82.2% of the concrete subjects and 78.6% of the formal sub-:-
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jects (_see Table 10). 
Examining Figures 3 and 4 also indicates that preoperation children 
tend to base the evaluative positivity or negativity of their disposi-
tional ratings on the consistent sequences. Further, a t-test for the 
differences between the midpoint of the scale and the consistently 
positive and negative sequences was marginally significant, ~ (27) = 
1.67, E <.06 (one tailed). Positive sequences were rated as evaluatively 
positive and negative sequences were rated as more evaluatively neutral 
(hypotheses IVA and IVB). Seventy-four percent of the .preoperational 
children rated consistently positive sequences as either "very, very 
good" or ''good," but only 50% of these subjects rated consistently 
negative sequences as "very, very bad" or "bad." Further, the distri-
bution of dispositional responses for the consistently negative sequences 
as compared to the consistently positive sequences may indicate that 
preoperational children have greater difficulty assigning dispositions 
to the negative information as compared to positive behaviors. Although 
the standard deviations for these consistent sequences were identical, 
it should be noted that the generally higher deviations for the preoper-
ational children as contrasted with the older groups may be reflective 
of the difficulty preoperational children may have in making disposi-
tional attributions. 
Planned comparisons of the ratings of both preoperational and 
grouped concrete and formal subjects substantiated the earlier finding 
that" subjects attribute more positive dispositions to PPN and NPP se-
quences as contrasted with NNP and PNN behaviors (!:. (1, 468) = 24.624, 
E <.001, F (1, 468) = 78.422, 2 <.001 , r espectively) . Specifically, 
when presented with inconsistent sets, all subjects appear to be basing 
TABLE 10 
Percent Usage of Dispositional Categories Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence 
Responses Across Sequences 
Dispositional Category 
pppa PPNb NNPC neutrald NNPe PNNt NNNg 
preoperational 60.7% 39.3% 25.0% 25.0% 7.1% 17.9% 17.9% 
"very, very concrete ·6o. 7% 14.3% 7.1% 17.9% 10.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
good" formal 71.4% 7.1% 7.1% 21.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
preoperational 14.3% 17.9% 21.4% 25.0% 7.1% 3.6% 3.6% 
"good" concrete 39.3% 17.9% 25.0% 50.0% 7.1% 3.6% 0.0% 
formal 21.4% 35.7% 60.7% 57.1% 14.3% 10.7% 14.3% 
"a little preoperational 0.0% 21.4% . 10.7% 14.3% 21.4% 7.1% 7.1% 
bit good" concrete 0.0% 35.7% 39.3% 10.7% 17.9% 7.1% 10.7% 
formal 0.0% 46.4% 17.9% 14.3% 39.3% 10.7% 3.6% 
preoperational 10.7% 3.6% 21.4% 7.1% 25.0% 25.0% 21.4% 
"a little concrete 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 17.9% 25.0% 7.1% 
bit bad" formal 3.6% 0.0% 10.7% 3.6% 17.9% 21.4% 3.6% 
preoperational 3.6% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 17 .• 9% 10.7% 
"bad" concrete 0.0% 17.9% 7.1% 3.6% 35.7% 42.9% 28.6% 
formal 3.6% 7.1% 3.6% 0.0% 25.0% 46.4% 39.3% 
preoperational 10.7% 10.7% 14.3% 21.4% 32.1% 28.6% 39.3% 
"very, very concrete ·0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 10.7% 21.4% 53.6% 
· bad" formal o.o%· 3.6% 0.0% 3.6% 3.6% 10.7% 39.3% 
2 2 2 2 . 
ax2(8)=14.55, ~ <.07 cX2(10)=22.90, ~ <.02 eX (10)=20.25, ~ <.03 gX (10)=26.19, ~ <.01 0\ 
bX (10)=23.63, ~ <.01 dX (10)=14.39, ~ >.10 2 N fX (10)=18.02, ~ <.06 
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their dispositional attributions on the evaluatively similar pieces of 
information within the set. If there are two positive behaviors within 
a set, dispositional ratings will tend to be.more positive than if there 
were two negative behaviors (nypotheses VA and VB). 
To check for effects of order of information, PPN sequences were 
contrasted with NPP sequences for preoperational children and grouped 
concrete and .formal subjects. Neither preoperational children (F (1, 
468) = 1.787, E >.10) nor combined concrete and formal subjects (! Ci, 
468) .099, E >.10) rated these sequences as significantly different. 
However, planned comparisons revealed a difference between ratings of 
NNP and PNN sequences for grouped concrete and formal subjects. That 
is, preoperational children did not differentiate their ratings on the 
basis of these sequences (F (1, 468) = .012, .E. >.10), but the combined 
concrete and formal subjects did, F (1, 468) = 10.429 ~ .E_< • 01. Speci-
fically, PNN sequences were rated significantly higher or "less good" 
than NNP sequences. One possible reason for the recency effects for 
the negative information and not the positive, might be a bias created 
by positive information. That is, older subjects may want to give the 
actor the ''benefit of the doubt" and bias ratings toward the positive 
end of the continuum. If the positive information is salient, subjects 
will average the information, maximizing the weight assigned to the 
similarly positive behaviors. If the negative information is most 
salient within the set (Le., PNN or NNP), older subjects will give the 
actor the "benefit of the doubt" if the single piece of positive infor-
mation comes last in the sequence. A final positive behavior may indi-
cate that the actor is changing or l1 2s changed for · better, thus 
subjects will assign a more positive rating. When PNN sequences are 
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presented, it is difficult to justify a positive rating because the ac-
tor appears to be changing for the worse. In summary, these results 
seem to indicate that older concrete and formal subjects tend to view 
the behavioral information in some sort of temporally sequential manner. 
Contrasting PPP behavioral sets with combined PPN and NPP sequences 
revealed significant differences for rating by both the preoperational 
and grouped concrete and formal levels of cognitive development (F (1, 
468) = 6.618, ~ <.05, F (1, 468) = 49.045, ~ <.001, respectively). How-
ever, contrasting NNN behavioral sets with combined NNP and PNN sequences 
revealed a difference for only the ratings of the grouped concrete and 
formal subjects, but not the preoperational children (F (1, 468) = 19.458, 
~ <.001 7 F (1, 468) = .335, ~ >.10, respectively). These differential 
trends for dispositional ratings by preoperational children may be re-
flective of their tendency to attribute intentionality to PPP sequences 
as contrasted with either the PPN or NPP sets. That is, the perceived 
intentionality of th~ behaviors may have facilitated the polarization 
of the dispositional attributions. Of course, this same tendency is 
apparent in the ratings of the combined concrete and formal subjects. 
Specifically, the PPP sequences being perceived as more intentional 
than PPN and NPP sequences, subsequently were assigned more positively 
polarized ratings. 
As compared to the older subjects, preoperational children did not 
differentiate between NNN sequences and ·combined NNP and PNN. sequences. 
This may be reflective of the preoperational children's failure to 
differentiate intentions underlying NNN behaviors as contrasted with 
either NNP or PNN behavioral sequences. This failure to discern inten-
tionality underlying either the consistent or inconsistent sets may 
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hinder any differential dispositional attributions. Thus, dispositional 
ratings based on NNN, NNP or PNN sequences are all evaluatively similar. 
This tendency to polarize judgments as a function of attributed 
intentionality is further supported by the correlations between inten-
tionality ratings and dispositional judgments adjusted to reflect polar-
ity. That is, assigning the same score to equally polarized disposi-
tional ratings permits correlations to be performed between the polarity 
of judgment and perceived intentions. The more intentional the behav-
iors are perceived, the more extreme or polarized shoul~ be the dispo-
sitional ratings. Specifically, the correlations obtained for PPP be-
havioral sequences were~ (26) = .263, E >.10, for preoperational sub-
jects and~ (54) = .347, E <.10 for the combined concrete and formal 
subjects. These correlations were not significantly different from one 
another, ~ = .319, E >.10. Correlations between intentionality and 
dispositional judgments for the NNN behavioral sequences were marginally 
higher for the grouped concrete and formal subjects (r (54) = .569, E 
<. 001) as compared to the preoperational children (~ (26) = .187, E >.10), 
~ = 1.65, E <.10 . . It is then plausible that the attribution of inten-
tionality is necessary before polarized judgments will be made. Only 
if a behavioral sequence is perceived as intentionally enacted will the 
actor be consistently labeled as "very, very good" or "very, very bad." 
Preoperational children do attribute intentionality to consistently 
positive behaviors, subsequently polarizing their dispositional judg-
ments. Consistently negative behaviors, however, are not perceived as 
intentionally enacted, thus preoperational children fail to polarize 
their judgments. 
The dispositional ratings based on the neutral behaviors were ex-
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pected to be evaluatively similar to the inconsistent sequences. 
Specifically, all cognitive levels were expected to rate the neutral 
behaviors midway between ratings based on consistently positive and 
consistently negative sequences. Examining Figure 3 'indicates that all 
cognitive levels rated neutral behaviors as somewhat similar to the PPN 
and NPP sequences. This trend may indicate a bias of subjects to assign 
more positive dispositions when the behavioral information presented 
-
is evaluatively neutral. That is, subjects appear to give the "benefit 
of the doubt" to the actor when the information presented is evaluative-
ly neither positive nor negative. 
In addition to the above analyses, an unequal~' two (sex of ex-
perimenter) by two (sex of subject) by three (cognitive level of oper-
ation) analysis of variance was performed to check for any interaction 
between sex of the experimenter and the sex of· the subject across cog-
nitive levels (see Table 11). No main effects for sex of subject, sex 
of experimenter, or cognitive level of operation was significant. There 
was, however, an interaction between the sex of subject and the sex of 
the experimenter, F (1, 576) = 7.038, E <.008. Comparisons of means 
presented in Table 12 indicate that pairs of similarly sexed experimen-
ters and subjects produced lower or evaluatively more positive disposi-
tions than heterosexual pairs. This interaction was not found for the 
intentionality ratings. Similarly, the interaction between sex of the 
experimenter and cognitive level was significant for dispositional rat-
ings (!. (2, 576) = 3.382, E. <.05)_, but not the intentionality ratings. 
Examining Table 12 reveals that the dispositional ratings made for the 
femal"' · :perimenter were more or less constant across cognitive levels, 
but the ratings for the male experimenter declined across levels. Un-
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TABLE 11 
Unequal n Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Dispositional Ratings 
Source 
Sex of subject (A) 
Sex of experimenter 
Cognitive 
A X B 
Ax c 
B X c 
Ax B x c 
Error 
* p <.01 
** p <.05 
level (C) 
MS df F 
3.300 1 1.130 
(B) 2.051 1 .702 
5 . 743 2 1.967 
20.549 1 7.038* 
3.885 2 1.331 
9.877 2 3.382** 
12.877 2 4.410** 
2,920 576 
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TABLE 12 
Means and Standard Deviations for Dispositional Ratings Broken-down by 
Sex of Subject and Sex of Experimenter 
Sex n mean* standard deviation 
Male subject 
Male experimenter 
preoperational 8 3.357 2.040 
concrete 3 3.190 1.887 
formal 5 3.057 1.679 
Female experimenter 
preoperational 5 3.886 1.922 
concrete 4 3.286 .1. 843 
formal 5 3.371 1.682 
Female subject 
Male experimenter 
preoperational 6 4.000 2.012 
concrete 11 3.455 1.667 
formal 9 2.952 1.507 
Female experimenter 
preoperational 9 2.540 1.435 
concrete 10 3.486 1.595 
formal 9 3.095 1.563 
*Mean ratings ren"ed from 1 ("very, very good") to 6 ("very, very bad"). 
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like the intentionality ratings, the three-way interaction between sex 
of experimenter, sex of subject, and cognitive level was also signifi-
cant (f (2, 576) = 2.674, E <.002. The means presented in Table 12 
indicate that the sex of ·experimenter, sex of subject interaction was 
primarily due to ratings made by preoperational children. The reasons 
for these interactions, however, are difficult to determine since it is 
not known whether the trends in data resulted from the sex of the ex-
perimenter per se or some particular qualities of the experimenter 
independent of sex (i.e., there was only one experimenter of each sex). 
Further, since this was essentially a secondary analysis of previously 
analyzed data, these findings may be due to chance. 
Summary. In summary, formal and concrete subjects appeared to 
base dispositional judgments on the "set" of behavioral information. 
As predicted, sets of consistently positive behaviors resulted in eval-
uatively positive ratings and negative behaviors resulted in evaluatively 
negative judgments. Although these ratings were not equally polarized, 
they appeared to be more polarized than the comparable ratings of the 
preoperational children. Further, the ratings of the inconsistent in-
formation were less polarized than the ratings based on the consistent 
sequences. Concrete and formal subjects apparently "average" inconsis-
tent behavioral information, primarily basing dispositional ratings on 
the evaluatively similar behaviors within the set. There also seems to 
be some evidence that concrete and formal subjects view the entire se-
quence in somewhat of a temporally sequential manner. That is, there 
appears to be a recency effect for the evaluatively similar behaviors 
within inconsistent sets. 
Subjects operating on the preoperational level also appear to be 
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basing dispositional ratings on the behavioral informntion presented. 
As predicted, evaluatively positive behaviors resulted in positive ra-
tings, and evaluatively negative behaviors tended to be rated as more 
neutral. That is, negative information resulted in ratings that 
appeared to be less polarized than ratings ensuing from positive actions. 
This is perhaps the result of the child's differential abilities at 
perceiving the intentions underlying actions. It is possible that con-
sistently positive behaviors are seen as more reflective of intentional-
ity than consistently negative actions. The intentionality of the 
positive behaviors may then be sufficient information to guide dispo-
sitional attributions. 
As contrasted with concrete and formal subjects, the dispositional 
ratings of preoperational children cannot totally be explained by a 
simple averaging model when the behavioral information is inconsistent. 
That is, preoperational children appear to be basing dispositional 
ratings on the information that is most salient within the behavioral 
set. In the behavioral sequences presented, the two evaluatively 
similar behaviors would be most salient. This is in contrast to the 
earlier predictions that preoperational children would base disposition-
al ratings on the roost temporally recent behavior within the set, in-
dependent of the preceeding behaviors. This indicates that children 
do not absolutely shift their perspective as the information changes, 
but can consider earlier information before making dispositional judg-
roents. However, this does not indicate that children will use the 
entire sequence in assigning ratings. Rather, the child's egocentrism 
and failure at mastering the concept of ·- -Jariance may have forced him 
or her to use only the most salient or evaluatively similar behaviors 
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within the sequence. This process appears to be further mediated by 
the evaluative polarity of the behavioral information that may or may 
not make salient the intentions of the actor. Specifically, consistent-
ly positive information highlights theintentionality of the actor, thus 
facilitating a distinction between PPP behavioral sets as contrasted 
with PPN and NPP sequences • . Consistently negative actions do not high-
light the actors' intentions, thus a distinction between NNN sets and . 
NNP or PPN sequences is not made. In this latter case, dispositions · 
are based on the most salient actions, the actor being seen as abso-
lutely bad with no differentiation of degrees of "badness." Of course, 
the less polarized judgments of preoperational children may reflect a 
response bias independent of dispositional attributions. For this and 
other reasons, a different response format was chosen for making 
behavioral predictions. 
Subjects' Behavioral Predictions 
The modified Moral Behavior Prediction Test (MBPT) was designed to 
further reflect dispositional attributions. That is, part of the reason 
for making attributions is to be able to predict an actor's fut~re be-
haviors. For example, an actor seen as a "good boy" might be expected 
to perform good acts. The MBPT was scored so that low scores would 
reflect more positive predictions than high scores. This allows 
correlations to be made between the six-point dispositional measure and 
the four-point predictions test. That these two scales are highly re-
lated is reflected by the significantly high correlations across all 
cognitive levels (i.e., preoperational: r (194) = .599, ~ <.001; con-
crete:£ (194) = .745, ~ <.001; formal: r (194) = .801, £ <.001. Des-
pite the apparent trend, a Fisher's r to z transformation revealed no 
significant differences in correlations between preoperational and 
grouped concrete and formal subjects,~= 1.17, ~ >.10. 
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To avoid any confounds with the actual order of presentation of the 
dispositional measure and the MBPT, the scales were alternately pre-
sented across sequences for each subject. For example, a given subject 
might receive the dispositional measure followed by the MBPT for the 
first sequence, the MBPT followed by the dispositional measure for the 
subsequent sequence, and so on. Using ~~tests, no differences in the 
dispositional or prediction ratings as a function of the order of 
presentation was found (~ (587) = .8987, ~ >.10; ~ (587) = .7607, ~ 
>.10, respectively). 
A two (sex of experimenter) by three (subjects' level of cognitive 
development) by seven (behavioral sequence) analysis of variance with 
subjects nested within the first two factors and repeated across the 
third was used for further analyses (see Tables 13 and 14). 
Main effects for prediction ratings. The effects found for pre-
diction ratings paralleled those found for the dispositional ratings 
(see Table 8) with the exception of an interaction between cognitive 
level and sex of experimenter which was not present for the prediction 
ratings. No main effects for either the sex of the experimenter or 
cognitive level of operation were found. A main effect for the behav-
ioral sequence was again significant,! (6, 468) = 64.0619, ~ <.001. 
Consistently positive and negative sequences produced the most polarized 
ratings with inconsistent PPN and NPP sequences producing more positive-
ly polarized predictions than the NNP and PNN sequences, ~ (83) = 8.95, 
.P. < .0001. 
To check for effects of order of information, NNP sequences were 
TABLE 13 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Prediction Ratings 
Source 
Sex of experimenter 
Cognitive level (B) 
A X B 
Error (between) 
Behavioral sequence 
Ax c 
B X c 
AxBx c 
Error (within) 
* p <.05 
** p <.001 
*** p <.01 
(A) 
(C) 
MS df F 
3.918 1 1.436 
.471 2 .173 
8.883 2 3.255* 
2. 729 78 
80.398 6 64.062** 
2.089 6 1.664 
7 •. 671 12 6.113*** 
.535 12 .426 
1.255 468 
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, TABLE 14 
Means and Standard Deviations for Prediction Ratings Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequence 
Behavioral Sequence 
Cognitive Level 
PPP PPN NNP Neutral NNP PNN NNN 
Preoperational 
mean 1.250 1.179 1.571 1.464 2.357 2.000 2.464 
standard deviation 1.206 1.219 1.501 1.290 1.393 1.466 1.347 
Concrete 
I ' mean .107 1.321 1.071 1.393 2.250 3.143 3.679 
standard deviation .315 1.492 1.274 1.499 1.531 1.380 .863 
Formal 
mean .536 1.143 1.071 .679 2.179 3.429 3.500 
standard deviation 1.105 .970 1.016 . 772 1.335 .836 1.000 
Note. Mean ratings ranged from 0 (no negative prediction ratings) to 4 (four negative prediction 
. ' 
ratings). 
J 
J' · 
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contrasted with PNN sets and PPN sequences were contrasted with the NPP 
sequences. T-tests revealed no significant differences between NPP and 
PPN sequences, .! (83) = .14, £. >.10. However, PPN sequences were more 
nega~ively polarized than NNP sequences, !_ (83) = 3.25, £. <.002. These 
trends in behavioral predictions are similar to those fo~nd for the 
dispositional ratings. 
lnteraction effects for prediction ratings. The hypothesized 
interaction between cognitive level of development and behavioral se-
quence was found to be significant, F (12, 468) = 6.1126, £. <.01. 
Planned comparisons between preoperational and grouped concrete and 
formal subjects were performed for the consistently positive and nega-
tive sequences. For both the consistently positive and negative sets, 
the grouped concrete and formal subjects made more polarized ratings 
than the preoperational children (! (1, 78) = 5.899, £. <.05; F (1, 78) 
= 8.685, £. <.01, respectfvely). Further, the ratings of the consistent 
sets by the older subjects deviated more from the midpoint of the 
prediction scale than the ratings of the preoperational children, !_ 
(82) = 4.20, £. <.001. This latter difference between cognitive levels, 
however, was not significant when tested across all behavioral sets, 
.! (82) = 1.02, £. >.10. Both preoperational children and grouped con-
crete and formal subjects rated inconsistent sequences containing two 
positive behaviors as significantly lower or "more good" than those 
containing only one positive action (i.e., preoperational: F (1, 468) 
10.273, £. <.01; grouped concrete and formal: F (1, 468) = 123.06, 
£. <.001). These statistics again support an averaging model for 
prediction ratings similar to that found for the dispositional ratings 
(see Figures 5 and 6). 
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To check for effects of order of information within inconsistent 
sets, PPN sequences were contrasted with NPP sequences for preoperational 
children and grouped concrete and formal suhjects. Neither preopera-
tional (F (1, 468) = 2.05, £. >.10) nor grouped concrete and formal sub-
jects (F (1, 468) = .711, £. >.10) rated these sequences as significantly 
different. Further, the preoperational children did not rate the NNP 
sequences as significantly different from the PNN sets, F (1, 468) = 
.512, £. >.10. Combined concrete and formal subjects, however, did rate 
PNN sequences as more negatively polarized than NNP sets, F (1, 468) 
= 22.31, £. <.01. 
As with the dispositional ratings, this order effect for older 
subjects may result from a sequential processing of the information. 
That is, latter behaviors may be seen as more reflective of presently 
existing characteristics of the actor. This perspective would facil-
itate a discounting by subjects of the earlier inconsistent piece of 
information. Further, it is also possible that NPP sequences are not 
more positively polarized than PPN sets because of a bias toward view-
ing the actor in the most positive light. Thus, the inconsistent piece 
of information within the inconsistent set is already being maximally 
discounted. 
Contrasting PPP behavioral sets with grouped PPN and NPP sequences 
revealed significant differences in ratings for combined concrete and 
formal subjects but not preoperational children (F (1, 468) = 19.209, 
£. <.001; F (1, 468) = .474, £. >.10, respectively) (see Figure 6). 
This is-in contrast to similar _analyses done for the dispositional 
measure where all cognitive levels indicated significant differences. 
A parallel pattern was found when comparing NNN behavioral sets with 
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grouped NNP and PNN sequences. This pattern revealed differences for 
only the combined concrete and formal subjects but not the preoperational 
children (F (1, 468) = 19.209, ~ <.001; F (1, 468) = 1.897, ~ >.10, 
respectively). 
One possible explanation for the differential finding of the 
dispositional and prediction ratings by the preoperational children may 
lie with the use of perceived intentions. That is, although intentions 
may be useful in the assessment of dispositions, they may not be use-
ful in prediction of future behaviors for preoperational children. 
Specifically, whereas the intentions underlying the consistently posi-
tive behaviors may have facilitated the attributions of dispositions, 
they may not have been useful in the prediction of how the actor would 
behave in the future. The preoperational child may have merely ex-
amined the behaviors and used the most salient component in guiding his 
or her predictions. Concrete and formal subjects ·may have continued 
to average this information before making a prediction, but similarly 
ignored their prior ratings of intentionality. For example, if a PPN 
sequence is presented, older subjects may simply predict that some of 
the future behaviors of the actor will be good and some will be bad, 
without considering the intentions of the actor. This is substantiated 
by the low correlations between intentions and prediction ratings ad-
justed to reflect polarized judgments, (i.e., preoperational:~ (194) 
= .155, ~ <.05; concrete: ~ (194) = .042, ~ >.10; formal: ~ (194) = 
.049, ~ >.10) as contrasted with the correlations between intentions 
and dispositions that were all significant at the .001 level (see 
7able 15). Th~ nplication is that the predictions made by the sub-
jects were not mediated by some dispositional construct that might have 
TABLE 15 
Correlations of Intentionality with Recall Scores and Polarized Prediction and Dispositional 
Ratings Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Behavioral Sequence 
Cognitive Level Behavioral Sequences 
PPP PPN NPP Neutral NNP PNN NNN 
Dispositional with 
Intentionality Ratings: 
preoperational .263 .215 .471 ** .184 .261 .092 .187 
concrete .259 .226 .256 .338* .067 .295 .661*** 
formal .418* .154 .140 .076 .070 .195 .478** 
Prediction with 
Intentionality Ratings: 
preoperational .345* .293 .325* .207 .360* -.186 -.154 
concrete .251 -.038 .065 .175 -.466** -.156 .301 
formal -.163 -.204 .070 .050 -.165 .226 .147 
Recall with 
Intentionality Ratings: 
preoperational .127 .185 .277 .009 .028 .305 .132 
concrete .254 -.056 .185 .000 -.057 .315 -.232 
formal -.160 .112 .271 -.191 -.124 -.464** -.443** 
Note. Prediction and dispositional ratings were adjusted so that extreme ratings were assigned lower 
scores than the less extreme ratings~ 
* .E. <.05 
**.E. <.01 
***.E. <.001 
(X) 
0 
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necessitated the consideration of intentions, but were based primarily 
on a direct extrapolation from past behaviors. Differential abilities 
of cognitive levels to examine the information may still have influenced 
these judgments, but the intention underlying the behaviors may not have 
been a salient consideration. 
Further interaction effects for prediction ratings. In addition 
to the above analyses, an unequal n, two (sex of experimenter) by two 
(sex of subject) by three (cognitive level of operation) analysis of 
variance was performed to check for any interaction effects between 
sex of the experimenter and sex of the subject across cognitive levels, 
(see Table 16 and 17). No main effects for sex of subject, sex of ex-
1 
perimenter, or cognitive level were found. The only significant inter-
action was between sex of experimenter and cognitive level. Examining 
Table 17 indicates that the male experimenter elicited increasingly 
more evaluatively positive predictions across cognitive levels but the 
female experimenter elicited fewer positive predictions across these 
same levels. These interactions are again difficult to interpret since 
it is not known whether these trends resulted from the sex of the ex-
perimenter per se or some particular qualities of the experimenter 
independent of sex. 
Summary. In summary, the processes of prediction appear to be 
very similar to those involved in making dispositional ratings. Older 
subjects (i.e., concrete and formal) appear to be averaging information 
before making their judgments, and preoperational children appear to be 
considering the most salient component within the set of behaviors. 
· :-IoHe·ve. :.' , perceived L. '.. tions may not be a consideration when these 
judgments are made. Rather, subjects appear to be examining the behav-
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TABLE 16 
Unequal n Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Prediction Ratings 
Source MS df F 
Sex of subject (A) 5.615 1 2.346 
Sex of experimenter (B) 3.449 1 1.441 
Cognitive level .958 2 .400-
AxB 5.642 1 2.357 
Ax c 2.183 2 .912 
B X c 7.765 2 3.244* 
A X B X c .727 2 .304 
Error 2.394 576 
* £. <.05 
TABLE 17 
Means and Standard Deviations for Prediction Ratings Broken-down 
by Sex of Subject and Sex of Experimenter 
83 
Sex n mean standard deviation 
Male subject 
Male experimenter 
preoperational 8 2.089 1.116 
concrete 3 1.810 1.601 
formal 5 1.629 1.646 
Female experimenter 
preoperational 5 1.943 1.494 
concrete 4 1.893 1. 707 
formal 5 2.029 1.581 
Female subject 
Male experimenter 
preoperational 6 2.024 1. 703 
concrete 11 1.935 1. 727 
formal 9 1.698 1.633 
Female experimenter 
preoperational 9 1.175 1.238 
concrete 10 1. 757 1. 723 
formal 9 1.841 1.370 
TABLE 18 
Percentage of Responses for Cognitive Levels that Attribute 
Responsibility to the Actor for Actions Resulting in both 
Positive and Negative Consequences 
Consequences 
Positive 
percentage 
frequency 
Negative 
percentage 
frequency 
Cognitive Level 
Preoperational 
62.2% 
61 
44.9% 
44 
Concrete 
56.1% 
55 
44.9% 
44 
Formal 
44.9% 
44 
49.0% 
48 
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ioral information and choosing those behaviors that would be a logical 
extension from the actor's past actions. 
Perceived responsibility of actor for ambiguous actions 
A statement was read to subjects that was ambiguous with respect 
to both the identity of the actor and the actor's intentions in per-
forming behaviors that had either positive or negative consequences. 
This statement was read after the intentionality, dispositional, and 
prediction scales had been completed. Subjects were asked to decide 
whether or not it was the actor in the previously described behavioral 
sequence that performed the ambiguous action. 
Responses to statements emphasizing positive consequences were 
classified by cognitive level and type of response (i.e., "yes" or 
"no"). A chi-square revealed that with higher levels of cognitive de-
velopment, there was less of a tendency to ascribe responsibility to 
the actor for those positive actions,x 2 (2) = 6.116, ~ < .05, (see Table 
18). That is, preoperational children tended to ascribe responsibility 
to the actor more so than older subjects. Further analyses were per-
formed for each . of the cognitive levels by breaking-down responses by 
behavioral sequence and response type. No significant trends were 
2 found for any of the three cognitive levels (i.e., preoperational:X (6) 
= 4.082, ~ >.10; concrete:x2 (6) = 7.790, ~ >.10; 2 formal:.x (6) = .990, 
~ >.10). In other words, when consequences are positive, the prior be-
haviors of the actor appear not to effect whether subjects rate the 
actor as performing the action or not. Apparently, both "good" and 
"bad" actors are likely to engage in actions that have positive conse-
quences, (see Figure 7). Frequencies :Jf "yes" responses br..-~ _i-down 
by sequences for preoperational, concrete and formal subjects are 
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presented in Table 19. 
Responses to statements emphasizing negative consequences were also 
broken-down by cognitive level and type of response (see Table 18). No 
trends were found across cognitive levels, X2 (2) = .438, ~ >.10. These 
responses were further ·broken-down by response type and behavioral se-
. quence for each of the cognitive levels. Preoperational children again 
failed to differentiate responses as a function of the behavioral se-
quence. That is, the prior behavioral information about the actor did 
not affect whether the child saw that actor as performing the ambiguous 
action. Both concrete and formal subjects, however, did respond in such 
a way that their "yes" or "no" response and the behavioral sequence were 
related (X 2 (6) = 29.289, ~ <.001; x2 (6) = 37.975, ~ <.001, respectively; 
see Table 20). 
The patterns of these yes-no responses seem to closely parallel 
the dispositional and prediction ratings of the concrete and formal 
subjects (see Figure 8). That is, actors who were rated as "good" were 
seen as not responsible for an action with negative consequences, where-
as actors who were rated as "bad" were rated as responsible for the 
actions. The more polarized the dispositional and prediction ratings, 
the greater the agreement among subjects on the responsibility of the 
actor for the action. The implication is that older subjects will use 
behavioral information in assigning responsibility for an ambiguous 
action when the consequences are negative, but not when positive. This 
may be reflective of an attributional bias of adults (Kelley, 1967). 
That _is, "the worse the consequences of an accidental event, the great-
er is the tendency to assign responsibility to the person possibly _ 
responsible for it." (Kelley, 1967, p. 223) When consequences are 
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TABLE 19 
Percentage of Subjects who Attributed Responsibility to the Actor 
for Actions Resulting in Positive Consequences 
Sequence 
Cognitive Level 
Preoperational Concrete Formal 
ppp 
percentage 57.1 57.1 42.9 
frequency 8 8 6 
PPN 
percentage 50.0 50.0 50.0 
frequency 7 7 7 
NPP 
percentage 64.3 35.7 35.7 
frequency 9 5 5 
Neutral 
percentage 50.0 42.9 42.9 
frequency 7 6 6 
NNP 
percentage 71.4 78.6 42.9 
frequency 10 11 6 
PNN 
percentage 64.3 57.1 50.0 
f~equency 9 8 7 
NNN 
percentage 78.6 71.4 50.0 
frequency 11 10 7 
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TABLE 20 
Percentage of Subjects who Attributed Responsibility to the Actor 
" 
for Actions Resulting in Negative Consequences 
Sequence 
Cognitive Level 
Preoperational Concrete Formal 
PPP 
percentage 42.9 14.3 7.1 
frequency 6 2 1 
PPN 
percentage 50.0 14.3 35.7 
frequency 7 2 5 
NPP 
percentage 50.0 42.9 35.7 
frequency 7 6 5 
Neutral 
percentage 50.0 21.4 21.4 
frequency 7 3 3 
NNP 
percentage 42.9 64.3 57.1 
frequency 6 9 8 
PNN 
percentage 28.6 . 71.4 92.9 
frequency 4 10 13 
NNN 
percentage 50.0 85.7 92.9 
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negative, responsibility is assigned or attributed on the basis of the 
prior behavioral information. The more negative the preceeding behaviors, 
the greater the tendency to ascribe responsibility to the actor. 13 
The preoperational child's inability to decenter from one isolated 
dimension of a situation may force him or her to focus on only the con-
sequences of an ambiguous action. Thus, he or she fails to consider 
prior behaviors of the actor even when subsequent actions are negative. 
Preoperational children then appear to be responding in somewhat of a 
random fashion. Of course, an alternative to this explanation might be 
that the preoperational children have a difficult time remembering the 
behavioral information, and consequently have no basis on which to assign 
responsibility. This is an important consideration and will be dis-
cussed later in the paper. 
Summary. In summary, concrete and formal subjects appear to assign 
responsibility on the basis of the prior information when the conse-
quences are negative, but not when positive. This may result from a 
tendency of adults to systematically assign responsibility more when 
the consequences are negative than when positive. These findings, how-
ever, only partially substantiate hypotheses VII and IX, which predicted 
that all attributions of responsibility would be based on the preceeding 
behavioral information. 
Younger preoperational children, through limitations imposed by 
their cognitive level of development or through inabilities to remember 
the behavioral information, were found to respond randomly when conse-
quences are either positive or negative. Thus, hypotheses VII and X 
remain unsupp9tter:l that attributin-nr of responsibility would be made 
when positive( consequences were preceeded by positive behaviors. 
', 
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Perceived intentions of actor for ambiguous actions 
Subsequent to the determination of whether the subject saw the actor 
as performing the ambiguous act, the perceived intentions und~rlying 
that action were assessed. That is, if subjects responded that the actor 
performed the action, the subject was next asked the degree to which the 
a·ctor "meant to" or ''did not mean to" perform that behavior. A "forced-
choice" format produced a four-point scale that was assumed to·be of 
equal interval. 
From examination of the means presented in Tables 21 and 22, there 
appears to be no differences in intentionality ratings as a function of 
cognitive level, valence of consequences, or behavioral sequence .(see 
also Figures 9 and 10). These results, however, may not be that sur-
prising in light of the complexities of the task. For example, the 
series of measures given between the behavioral presentation and this 
measurement of intentionality might have obscured the actual behavioral 
information. Further, even if aware of the behavioral information, 
subjects might have been confused by the temporal separation between 
behavioral stimuli and this measure. 
That is, subjects may not have recognized the "legitimacy" of using 
this information in making their assessments of intentionality. There 
is also the problem of subject selection, since subjects placed them-
selves into this sample on the basis of their response to the preceeding 
question. Only if they saw the actor as actually engaging in the am-
biguous action were they asked about the intentions behind these behav-
iors. Thus, it is at least possible that a unique population existed 
that was characterized by dispositions or orientations that influenced 
the intentionality judgments. 
TABLE 21 
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Based on Positive Consequences of Ambiguous 
Actions Broken-down by Cognitive Level and Sequences 
Behavioral Sequence 
Cognitive Level 
PPP PPN NPP Neutral NNP PNN NNN 
Preoperational 
mean 1. 750 2.000 2.000 1. 714 2.700 2.333 2.091 
s tandard deviation 1.035 1.414 1.323 1.113 1.337 1.323 1.375 
n 8 7 9 7 10 9 11 
Concrete 
mean 2.250 2.143 3.200 2.667 2.545 2.250 2.600 
3tandard deviation 1.389 1.345 1.304 1.506 1.368 1.282 1.265 
n 8 7 5 6 11 8 10 
Formal 
mean 1.667 1.714 1.600 1.500 2.167 1.857 2.143 
standard deviation 1.506 1.254 .894 1.225 1.329 1.215 1.345 
n 6 7 5 6 6 7 7 
\0 
VJ 
TABLE 22 
Means and Standard Deviations for Intentionality Ratings Based on Negative Consequences of Ambiguous 
Actions Broken-down ~ Cognitive Level and Sequence 
Behavioral Sequence 
Cognitive Level 
PPP PPN NPP Neutral NNP PPN NNN 
Preoperational 
mean 2.667 2. 714 2.571 2.429 2.833 1. 750 2.143 
standard deviation 1. 366 .951 1. 272 1.272 1.472 .957 1. 215 
n 6 7 7 7 6 4 7 
Concrete 
mean 2.500 2.500 2.833 2.333 2.556 2.000 1.833 
standard deviation .707 .707 .753 .577 .762 1.054 1.030 
n 2 2 6 3 9 10 12 
Formal 
mean 4.000 2.600 3.200 3.333 2.125 2.462 2.385 
standard .deviation 0.0 1.140 .837 1.155 1.246 1.266 1. 325 
n 1 5 5 3 8 13 13 
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It is also interesting to note that no differences were found be-
tween positive and negative sequences. It is possible that once respon-
sibility for a negative or positive action is assigned, the intentions 
underlying that action are not an important consideration. However, 
another possibility might be that subjects were more concerned with who 
performed the action and failed to focus on whether the consequences 
were negative or positive. Thus, when subjects were assessing inten-
tionality, the consequences were not a salient factor. 
Differences between cognitive levels of operation .also were not 
found. In light of the earlier evidence that older subjects appear 
most able to discern intentions, this may further indicate that sub-
jects did not recognize the importance of using the prior behavioral 
information in assessing intentions. That is, older concrete and for-
mal subjects apparently have the ability to discern intentions after 
the definite behavioral information is presented, but whether they use 
,, 
these ''intentions" and behaviors in interpretation of ambiguous actions 
is still questionable. 
Summary. In summary, a number of reasons may account for the lack 
of differences in intentionality ratings. It should not be concluded 
that subjects cannot use behavioral information in assessing intentions 
underlying ambiguous actions. Rather, a new methodological approach 
must be used before these questions can be answered. 
Recall of behavioral information by subjects 
Immediately after the presentation of measures pertaining to the 
ambiguous actions, subjects were asked to recall the behavioral infor-
mation which was initially presented. This V.7 a S to determine whett:: ~ 
responses mightbe attributed to differential abilities to remember the 
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information presented. Each positive or negative behavior correctly re-
called received a score of "1". That is, each subject had two recall 
scores, a positive and a negative. For example, in PPP sequences, three 
positive behaviors recalled would receive a score of "3" in the positive 
category and a "O" in the negative category. Since only positive be-
havior were presented in this sequence, it· would have been impossible 
for the subject to score more than "0" in the negative category or more 
than "3" in the positive. Of course, the subject might recall less 
than all three of the behaviors in this sequence, in which-case the 
score in the positive category would reflect the number correctly re-
called. l4 
A three (subject's level of cognitive development) by six (behav-
ioral sequence) by two (positive and negative categories of behavioral 
information) analysis of variance with subjects repeated across the 
last two factors was used to analyze the data (see Table 23). 
A main effect was found for the cognitive level of operation, F 
(2, 81) = 34.587, E <.001. Differences resulted from preoperational 
children having significantly greater difficulty recalling the behavior-
al information than concrete and formal subjects (r (82) = 8.14, E <.001). 
No differences were found between concrete and formal subjects, ~ (54) = 
1.36, ~ >.10. This finding is supportive of other studies (e.g., Hagen, 
Meacham, & Mesibov, 1970) which have found that younger children do have 
more difficulty remembering information than older subjects. Addition-
ally, this finding may account for the less polarized ratings of the 
preoperational children as contrasted with the concrete and formal 
-~ oups. That is, the inability to remember the behaviors of the actor 
may result in less confident dispositional and prediction judgments-
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TABLE 23 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Behaviors Recalled 
Source MS df F 
Cognitive level (A) 27.656 2 34.587* 
Error (between) .800 81 
Behavioral sequence (B) .713 5 1. 979 
Ax B .475 10 1. 317 
Error (within) .360 405 
Valence (C) 1.286 1 4.358** 
Ax C .574 2 1.947 
Error (within) .295 81 
B X c 29.474 5 81.236*** 
A X B X C 2.627 10 7.240 
Error (within) • 363 405 
* p <.001 
** p <.05 
*** p <.0001 
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which may be reflected in less polarization of ratings. Another explan-
ation for the lower recall scores of the younger subjects is a failure 
to attend to the information. Subjects may not have been listening to 
the behavioral information~ and as a result were unable to verbalize it. 
Both of the above interpretations~ however, should be approached 
with caution for a number of reasons. As an example, the recall measure 
was given as the last measure, and accordingly was mediated by a variety 
of other questions and scales. An inability to remember the information 
at the end of the task does not mean he or she was unaware of and did 
not use the behavioral information in preceding measures. That is, the 
child may have remembered the information for his initial responses, but 
forgot the behaviors as the time elapsed. Further, it might be argued 
that awareness or recall of the exact information is not necessary in 
making dispositional and prediction ratings. ·The "valence" of that 
information (i.e., either positive or negative) may be more important 
than the specific behaviors. It is pos_sible that once the "valence" 
of the behaviors was ascertained, subjects simply used that information 
and "forgot" the specific actions. It is also possible that the behav-
ioral information is no longer important once an attribution has been 
made. That is, once a subject has decided whether the actor is "good" 
or "bad," it may be unnecessary to remember "why" he or she is ''good" 
or "bad." As support for this, Anderson and Hubert ' (1963) obtained 
evidence for separate memory systems for the impression itself and for · 
the words. They suggested that as each word was received, its meaning 
was extracted and integrated into the current impression. The word was 
no ·Jc,:; r necessary and was stored elsewhere. 
Significant differences were found between the positive and negative 
information recalled. That is, positive information tended to be re-
called more frequently than negative behaviors, ! (1, 81) = 4.358, ~ 
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< .05. This may indicate that positive and negative information may 
differ on some other dimension than "valence." It should be noted that 
the interaction between cognitive level and valence of information was 
not significant. This suggests that the positivity or negativity of the 
information did not differentially affect the ratings made by the var-
ious cognitive levels. However, the interaction between valence of 
behavioral information and behavioral sequence was significant, F (5, 
405) = 81.236, ~ <.0001. This was expected, of course, because of the 
consistently positive and negative sequences. If only positive infor-
mation is presented, for example, it would be impossible for a subject 
to score anything but a "O" in the positive recall category. 
Summary. In summary, the preoperational child's inability to re-
call behavioral information may account for their less polarized pre-
diction and dispositional ratings as contrasted with older subjects. 
However, other factors intrinsic to the experimental procedure may sim-
ilarly account for the lower recall scores without assuming the children 
were not using that information when making their ratings. In addition, 
it cannot be assumed that children were not paying attention to the 
information since factors other than the specific behavioral information 
may mediate the . attribution process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although many of the specific hypotheses in this study were not 
supported, results did indicate certain trends in the development of 
the ability to make dispositional and responsibility attributions. Be-
fore these trends are reviewed, however, certain assumptions and limi-
tations of the study will be discussed. 
Assumptions and limitations 
One of the primary assumptions was that the verbal responses of the 
subjects would be accurate reflections of the actual cognitive processes 
of the subjects. That is, the ability to verbally communicate one's 
thoughts may influence one's response capability. Of course, this may 
be a potential confou~d in much of psychological research, but it be-
comes a particularly salient consideration when dealing.with children. 
The present study attempted to limit the dependence on the child's 
ability to verbally communicate his or her thoughts by using pictoral 
and verbal stimuli. The child was required to respond by repeating the 
verbal expression which he or she deemed most appropriate, or by point-
ing to that picture most reflective of his or her thoughts. Further, 
when a verbal response was required the choices were presented by a 
paired comparison method that "forced" the child to pick between only 
two items at one time. Certainly these methodological approaches did 
not guarantee that responses were a direct reflection of cognitive pro-
cesses, but they did limit the confounds with the child's ability to 
verbally communicate information. 
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Perhaps a more critical assumption was that the "meaning" of the 
categories comprising each of the dependent measures would be the same 
across all levels of cognitive development. For example, it was assumed 
that "very, very . good" would carry the same evaluative connotation for 
all subjects. The validity of this assumption is an important consider-
ation, since the child's ability to use interval data has not been fully 
documented. Thus, there is the possibility that children do not readily 
differentiate between such categories as "very, very good" and "good" 
in the same way that adults do. 
In this study, varying degrees of "goodness" and "badness" were 
made salient through the dimension of size, in addition to requiring 
all subjects to label the picture most reflective of their judgments. 
Again this does not guarantee that for all subjects the connotative 
meaning was the same. However, by using pictoral stimuli it does make 
salient the interval nature of the categories. That is, both pictoral 
and verbal stimuli should mutually aid in highlighting the variations 
in the evaluative meaning of the stimuli. 
A further assumption was that the behavioral information presented 
would carry the same degree of evaluative "goodness" or "badness" for 
all subjects. Although the choice of behaviors used was dependent on 
.previous evaluative ratings that were lowest in standard deviations for 
all ages, thi~ may still have been a problem. That is, in rating the 
behaviors, subjects may still have had to first determine whether the 
"action" was intentional or not befor.e a judgment could be made. -The 
problem is · that this was what the present study had hoped to determine; 
whether intentions were a factor in attributional processes. It then 
only becomes an -assumption that the behaviors presented were perceived 
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as similar in evaluative meaning across all subjects. 
Certain limitations of this study should also be clarified before 
any further interpretation of results is attempted. For example, the 
"actor" that enacted the behaviors and the "entities" to which these 
behaviors were directed were all males. Male stimuli were used because 
the author felt that behaviors that were clearly evaluatively negative 
were more highly associated with males (e.g., hitting) than females. 
Further, it was decided that the "entities" to which the actions were 
directed should be similarly sexed to avoid differentia.! evaluative 
judgments of behaviors directed toward females as opposed to males. 
Theoretically, the interpretation of the results should then be limited 
to male actors behaving toward male entities. However, since this study 
was concerned with how children can process behavioral information in 
making attributions, the question of sex is of no immediate relevance. 
Clearly, many factors may influence the subject's judgments, the sex of 
the "actors" being only one. This, of course, does not mean that these 
factors are not of interest and should not be examined in subsequent 
investigations, but merely that the "sex of actor and entity" are not 
active concerns of this study. 
A further limitation of this study was that the behaviors appeared 
to characterize a very young actor. Although the specific age of the _ 
"actor" was not specified, many subjects gave verbal indications that 
they perceived him as a "little boy." Unfortunately, this was an 
unavoidable product of the design of the study. That is, in choosing 
behaviors that were clearly "meaningful" to all ages and yet were 
. either evaluati~;e ly pc:s itive or negu="' - .! , simple behaviors had to be 
selected. Behaviors that ate "simple," yet either "positive" or "nega-
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tive'' are frequently physical actions. Simple physical actions appear 
to be indicative of a young actor. The age of the actor per se would 
not be a problem, if impressions were based solely on the information 
presented. However, impressions are influenced by the other knowledge 
or "constructs" one brings to the situation. That is, various aged 
observers may have different conceptions of.what "little boys" are like 
and the way that they behave. This may have an impact on the impress-
ion formation process, confounding the interpretations made of the be-
havioral manipulations. 
Another limitation of this study was with the dependent measures. 
To insure simplicity of presentation and understanding, a "paired com-
parison" was used for the intentionality scales. This limited the 
number of "categories" on the scale to four, in addition to "forcing" 
the child to decide whether the actor performed the action.. The lack 
of variation within the scale may not have been sensitive enough to 
"pick-up" the degrees of cognitive differentiation actually being made 
by the subject. Thus, the scales may only be picking tip the "crudest" 
of differences between behavioral stimuli. In addition, the lack of a 
mid-point between the categories of "meant to" and "didnot mean to" may 
have eliminated a legitimate category. That is, subjects may not have 
actually known whether the actor "meant to" or "didnot mean to" perform 
the actions. Of course, "forcing" the subject to look for the inten-
tions was the purpose of this experiment, but it may not accurately re-
flect cognitive operations occurring under more natural circumstances. 
Further, this procedure eliminated the possibility of subjects "playing 
it safe" by choosing the most neutral category. Pilot observations 
had indicated that young children were apt to utilize the neutral ratings 
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unless "forced" to make an actual decision about the intentionality of 
the actor • 
. It might also be questioned whether the intentionality scale is 
really a measurement of intentions, and, further, whether the scale is 
really of an interval nature. For example, the concept of "meaning to" 
may not be an accurate reflection of perceived intentions. In addition, 
the interval between such categories as ' 'really meant to" and "sort of 
meant to" may not be the same as between "sort of meant to" and "sort of 
did not mean to." If dealing solely with adults, using . numerically 
bipolar scales weighted at the ends by "very intentional" and "very un-
intentional" may have been a more desirable approach. However, when 
questioning children, the usefulness of this procedure is marginal. It 
was decided that applying labels to each point on the scale would more 
meaningfully differentiate the degrees of intentionality than mere 
points on the scale. Further, it was felt that the use of terminology 
with which the child was familiar would also communicate more "meaning" 
to the child. It is then only an assumption that the scales are of an 
interval nature and that the terminology used does reflect varying de-
grees of perceived intentionality. 
Of course, the interval nature and construct validity of the dis-
positional measure might also be questioned. This is because, as with 
the intentionality measures, labels were applied.to each point on the 
dispositional scale. However, the additional use of pictoral stimuli 
to depict the points may have produced an additional confound not pre-
sent with the intentionality scale. That is, the pictures may have 
portrayed affective coF:)onent ::: not necessar::.::_ characteristic of "good" 
and ''bad" dispositions. For example, the "good boy" Jllight also be 
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labeled as "happy" thereby confusing the child in making his ratings. 
To minimize this confound, subjects were required to apply the dispo-
sitional label to that picture that portrayed their judgment. This 
would guarantee that all subjects had, at least, verbalized the dispo-
sitional concept. In addition, degrees of good and bad respectively 
portrayed the same "good boy" and "bad boy" caricatures; variations in 
degrees only being reflected in the gradient of size. In other words, 
the same affective stimuli was constant across the degrees of "good-
ness" and "badness," thus minimizing the possibility that a given por-
trayal might affect ratings differentially. 
A further limitation is found with the modified MBPT. The large 
number of sequences to which subjects were asked to respond necessitated 
that the original ten-item MBPT be shortened to four items. As with 
the other dependent measures, this may not have been sensitive enough 
to pick up variations in actual cognitive processes. Further, the 
forced-choice format of the scale did not allow subjects a neutral or 
"I don't know" alternative. Thus, the actual choice made may not be 
reflective of those cognitive processes occurring in more typical 
settings. 
The development of the ability to assess behavioral intentions 
Following Kelley's (1967) theory, a prerequisite to making dispo-
sitional attributions is the judging of the observed behaviors as "in-
tentional." Accidental behaviors or actions that are coerced are viewed 
as unintentional; and thus are not reflective of the actor's personal 
dispositions. Intentionality is determined by examining the behaviors 
and the situational circumstances. If no situational information is 
given, an observer :must rely on the actor's behaviors and his own ex-
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periences and knowledge to determine both the intentions and disposi-
tions of the actor. Two components of this behavioral information that 
may have an impact on these attributional processes are the consistency 
and evaluative polarity of the information. 
At the preoperational level of cognitive development, children are 
operating from an egocentric position. That is, these children have 
yet to realize that their thoughts, wants and feelings are different 
from those of other peoples. Accordingly, preoperational children · 
have difficulty understanding the reasons why another .ch_ild is behaving 
in a given way. Specifically, it was hypothesized that preoperational 
children would have more difficulty than older subjects making attri-
butions of intentionality based on the behavioral information. Re-
sults supported this hypothesis that preoperational children did rate 
the actor's behaviors across sequences as less intentional (i.e., 
"meaning to") than concrete and formal subjects. This lower polariza-
tion resulted from the younger subjects distributing responses somewhat 
equally across all response categories. This would indicate that the 
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preoperational children may have had difficulty consistently attributing 
any intentionality to behaviors. 
Another finding was that all subjects tended to rate "consistent" 
sequences (both positive and negative) as indicative of a higher degree 
of intentionality than "inconsistent" sequences. This is not particu-
larly surprising for the concrete and formal subjects, who having 
mastered the concept of invariance, have both learned to expect con-
sistencies in behaviors across modalities. That is, unless the actor's 
behaviors are seen as unir.tentic:1al, older subjPr+-s will expect a cer-
tain degree of invariance in those behaviors. It might then be expected 
that older subjects might maintain "invariance" by labeling inconsis-
tent behaviors as less reflective of intentions than consistent behav-
iors. 
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A closer examination of the preoperational's intentionality ratings 
was made to check for differential judgments of consistently positive 
and consistently negative information. Analyses revealed that it was 
the consistently positive behaviors that were rated intentional and 
not the consistently negative sequences (which were rated similar to 
the inconsistent behaviors). This supports Costanzo's et al. (1974) 
conclusion that preoperational children attribute intentions behind 
positive actions more readily than behind negative behaviors. 
The implication of this is that preoperational children may more 
readily make dispositional attributions when the behavioral information 
is positive. That is, dispositional ratings should be more polarized 
when the behavioral information is positive as opposed to negative. 
The figures of the dispositional and prediction ratings do indicate 
that for preoperational children, positive ratings are more polarized 
than negative ratings as contrasted with the comparisons in the judg-
ments of concrete and formal subjects. That intentions are differen-
tially related to dispositional ratings for consistently positive and 
negative information across cognitive levels of operations is also re-
flected in correlational differences. Correlations between degree of 
intentionality and polarity of the dispositional judgments were tested 
for significant differences between preoperational and grouped concrete 
and formal subjects. No differences were found between groups when the 
behavioral information was consistently positive. However, when the 
presented information was consistently negative, the grouped concrete 
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and formal subjects saw intentionality and polarity of dispositional 
ratings as significantly more related than the ratings of the preoper-
ational subjects. This indicates that perceived intentions are related 
to the polarization of dispositional judgments. Further, it indicates 
that preoperational children more readily attribute intentions behind 
consistently positive information, resulting in more positive polarized 
dispositional attributio:ns. 
Although the correlations between dispositional ratings and the MBPT 
were significantly related for all subjects, it is interesting to note 
the somewhat inexplicable correlations between intentionality and polar-
ization of prediction ratings. This may indicate that the two functions 
of any dispositional attribution (i.e., explanation and prediction) are 
based on different information. That is, while the intentions of an 
actor were useful in explaining behaviors (i.e., making a dispositional 
attribution), the actual prediction of future behaviors may be based 
more on the past behaviors per se without real consideration of the 
underlying intentions. More specifically, subjects will take account 
of the intentions of an actor before rating him as a "good" or "bad" 
boy; but, how that boy is predicted to behave in the future is more 
related to how he has behaved in the past. Of course, the dispositional 
measure and the MBPT are correlated because both scales are ultimately 
based on the behavioral information. The difference may only be that 
to make a dispositional attribution, the mediating factor of intentions 
must be considered, while to make a prediction only the past actions 
may be necessary. However, this is not to imply that the prediction 
of future behaviors may never necessitate tl-.e assessment of inte11 ~~Jns. 
In the present study, the behavioral information presented and the 
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behaviors portrayed in the MBPT were of the same simplistic nature. 
Thus, it may not have been necessary for subjects to consider the in-
tentionality of the actions before making a prediction. The subjects 
may merely have had to choose those behaviors that most paralleled the 
behavioral information presented. In more complex prediction tasks, 
it may be necessary for the subject to examine the intentions before 
he can make a prediction confidently. 
There does appear to be a trend toward averaging of the behavioral 
information. That is; increasing the amount of positive · information 
results in increasingly lower ratings. This is not surprising for the 
concrete and formal subjects who have mastered the concept of invar-
iance. To achieve a "meaningful" disposition, they must consider the 
"set" of behavioral information and the degree to which it reflects the 
actor's intentions. Since all behaviors appear t .o be at least somewhat 
reflective of intentionality~ information is weighted in a manner that 
dispositional attributions can be made that are reflective of all the 
behaviors within the set. For preoperational children, there appears 
to be a leveling-off effect for the PPP and NNN sequences.. That is, 
preoperational children are rating PPP and PPN or NPP behavioral se-
quences as somewhat similar and also NNN and NNP and PNN sequences as 
similar. Clearly, a simple averaging model fails to completely explain 
these ratings patterns. 
These patterns do, however, make intuitive sense if we assume that 
the preoperational children were guided by the principle of "absolute 
invariance" (Livesley & Bromley, p. 212). That is, the child's ego-
cc,, crism and failure at mastering the invariance principle, leads him 
or her to regard others as either absolutely good or bad. The child 
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apparently observes the entire "set," but does not attempt to make 
"sense" of any inconsistent information by weighting it in the final 
impression. Not expecting the behaviors of others to be constant, 
judgments are simply based on that information which is most salient 
within the set. Apparently, the less consistent piece of information 
within inconsistent sets is simply ignored. Of course, these results 
are in contrast to the hypothesis that the most temporally recent piece 
-
of information would be most salient to preoperational children. This, 
however, could result from children seeing the entire set as a single 
event and not mutually independent sequential events. It is possible 
that if there were more of a temporal lag between behaviors the most 
recent piece of information within the set would have been salient. 
There was a significant tendency to rate PPP information as in-
dicative of more positive dispositions than the PPN and NPP sequences. 
This is contradictory to what might be predicted if children were 
guided solely by the "absolute invariance" principle. This contrast 
may result from the child's inability to assign intentions to the con-
sistently- positive actions. That is, the preoperational child may be 
able to overcome the more salient aspects of the information to take 
account of intentions before judgments are made. The more intentional 
an action is perceived, the more reflective it is of a disposition. In 
situations where the negative information is salient (i.e., NNN, NNP, 
and PNN sequences), the child does not attribute intentionality to the 
actions of the actor. Thus, all ratings are absolutely based on the 
negatively salient behaviors. The principle of absolute invariance is 
operative. 
Examining the MBPT ratings, it appears that preoperational chil-
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dren are not differentiating between the PPP and the PPN and NPP be-
haviors, as contrasted with the dispositional measure. Again this may 
result from the subjects in this study not considering intentions be-
fore making behavioral predictions. That is, the behavioral information 
by itself seems to be sufficient in making a behavioral prediction. 
Thus, for the MBPT ratings, the most salient features ·of the information 
appear to be guiding the preoperational children's judgments, while 
older subjects appear to be taking an "averaging" approach. 
In summary, the ability to discern intention helps divorce the 
child from the absoluteness of his perspective. This facilitates exam-
ination of the invariances found within the set of behaviors. Dispo-
sitional judgments will then be based on the consistencies or inconsis-
tencies found within that set of information. 
The development of the ability to assign responsibility on the basis of 
prior behavioral information 
Just as subjects can attribute dispositions and make predictions on 
the basis of behavioral information, they can, apparently, assign re-
sponsibility for ambiguous actions. The use of behavioral information 
is most obvious for concrete and formal subjects when the consequences 
of the ambiguous actions are negative. That is, when behaviors result 
in physical damages to other persons or property a bias toward attri-
buting those consequences to a personal causation is evident. Respon-
sibility is then assigned on the basis of prior behavioral information. 
The principle of invariance is operative. A person who has performed 
negative actions in the past is probably responsible for present nega-
. tiveconsE: .:t ~. 1ces; while a person who does "good" things is unlikely 
to perform actions which result in consequences that are negative. The 
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younger preoperational children, not having mastered the concept of 
invariance, have no basis on which to assign responsibility. That is, 
not seeing the prior behavioral information as reflective of the actor's 
intentions, the child has no reason to think that "good" or ''bad" boys 
will differentially be responsible for the negative consequences stemming 
from ambiguous actions. 
When the consequences of an ambiguous action are positive, a some-
what different pattern prevails. That is, there appears to be no sys-
tematic tendency to assign responsibility on the basis of .the prior 
behavioral information. This may reflect the desire of subjects to 
"give the benefit of the doubt" to all actors, either good or bad; or 
a realization that even bad boys are not bad all of the time. This 
interpretation may be particularly applicable since actors appeared to 
be characterized as very young. Specifically, if the actors were 
labeled as "adults" this "bias" of giving the "benefit of the doubt" 
to even the actors characterized by negative behaviors might not be 
present. Subjects might then be "forced" to examine the behavioral in-
formation and assign responsibility on the basis of what seems to be 
"invariant" characteristics of the actor. The preoperational child's 
inability to assign intentions to the behavioral information may then 
hinder him or her in attributing responsibility. 
The implications of this may then be that negative consequences 
"force" subjects to search for "invariant" properties of actors which 
might "explain" the actions. Positive consequences do not produce a 
"bias" toward attributions of personal causation; thus, personal biases 
or previously formulated "personal constructs" are salient. The de-
velopment of the principle of invariance in subjects is an important 
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factor if attributions of responsibility are to be made solely on the 
information given, but is unnecessary if other sources of information are 
influential. Thus, subjects may look at behavioral information and 
assign responsibility for positive consequences as a result of "feeling 
sorry for" or because of a belief that there is "no such thing as a 
really bad boy." However, the assignment of responsibility for negative 
consequences is a more serious matter and must be mediated by percep-
tions of intentionality underlying the prior behavioral information. 
The inability to attribute intentions to actions results in a failure 
to examine the invariances found within those behaviors. Accordingly, 
responsibility can not be assigned on the basis of consistencies with 
prior behavioral information. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lrn this experiment, children may have focused more on the conse-
quences of a transgression than on the intentions because the actor's 
behaviors were more public. That is, to take account of the less salient 
_intentions of the actor may have necessitated that the child decenter 
from his egocentric perspective. 
2There is an exception to this general rule. That is, a person _may 
make a dispositional attribution based on other than intended behaviors. 
For example, a person who is consistently clumsy may be labeled as a 
"bad boy," if his clumsiness results in material or personal damages. 
The present study will attempt to avoid this possible confound by using 
only "willful behaviors." That _is, only behaviors that are clearly 
reflective of intentionality will be used as stimuli. 
3Explanations of "ambiguous behaviors" are here referring to two 
judgments. The first is whether an actor did or did not perform a given 
action. The second, assuming the actor did perform the action, is one 
of intentionality. That is, it may subsequently be determined whether 
the actor meant to perform the action. 
4rt should be noted that the "ideal" way to check for primacy and 
recency effects would be to include sets where the inconsistent behavior 
was introduced between the two consistent behaviors (i.e., PNP; NPN). 
However, since these additional sets would produce an unmanageable num-
ber o~ experimental conditions, they were excluded from the present study. 
It would be expected that dispositional attributions based on these new 
variations in the order of behavioral information would be no different 
than attributions based on sets similar in degree of evaluative positivity 
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or negativity. However, later studies might investigate how variations 
in the ordering of information affect judgments of confidence in one's 
dispositional attributions. 
SThe preoperational child's inability to decenter dictates that only 
one dimension of a situation is examined at one time. When information 
is inconsistent, the most · temporally recent behavior should be salient 
to the child and guide subsequent responses. Accordingly, preoperation-
al children should make more positively and negatively polarized judg-
ments than older children when sets are inconsistent. That is, older 
children will consider all behaviors within the set of actions inte-
grating inconsistent behaviors, while preoperational children may not 
attempt to integrate inconsistent actions. 
6rnteraction effects are then expected between the polarity of the 
most temporally recent .piece of behavioral information and the conse-
quences of the subsequent action. Temporally recent positive behaviors 
may facilitate subsequent attributions of responsibility and intention-
ality when consequences are positive but not negative. Temporally recent 
negative behaviors may hinder attributions based on the positive or 
negative consequences. 
7Although the set of three neutral behaviors is evaluatively con-
sistent, unless otherwise stated, "consistent sets" will refer exclu-
sively to either consistently positive or consistently negative sets. 
8This prediction might have been based on a simple averaging model 
(Anderson, 1965). However, generalizations based on this· model must be 
made carefully since Anderson maintains that the final judgment be on 
the same dimension on which the preceding information or stimuli was rated. 
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Although it might be argued that "good" and "bad" dispositional judgments 
lie along the same dimension on which the preceding individual behaviors 
were judged, this is . still an assumption since dispositional judgments 
may not be a unidimensional construct. 
9rt should be noted that no tests were given to differentiate sub-
jects operating at concrete and formal levels. It was expected that no 
differential trends in attributions of dispositions or intentions would 
-be found for these two groups. The formal group was included to extend 
the generalizability of any findings and as a precaution to determine 
whether any differences in attribution processes did occur at this level 
as contrasted with the earlier concrete level. 
lOrt should be noted that all actors were given male names, since 
the behaviors were more stereotypically male. 
llThe alternating of the disposition and prediction scales was the 
only variation in the order of presentation of the dependent measures. 
These scales were alternated since parallel responses to them were ex-
pected. The preceding scale of intentionality, which was considered to 
-be of primary importance in this study, was not alternated with any other 
measure. 
12As was expected, there was no statistical difference between in-
tentionality ratings of concrete subjects and those of formal subjects. 
Examining differences in ratings of specific sequences, however, reveals 
some variations which may be statistically different. Since the primary 
focus of this study was examination of preoperational children as - con- . 
trasted with older subjects, any differences in ratings between concrete 
and formal subjects will not be discus ~ed in this paper. 
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13rhere may be an alternative explanation to why older subjects 
assign responsibility on the basis of preceding behaviors when conse-
quences are negative but not positive. That is, negative consequences 
may be seen as more clearly negative thart positive consequences are pos-
itive. This also demonstrates the difficulty in interpreting differences 
between positive and negative'sequences. There may be qualitative diff-
erences between these sequences in addition to the difference in degree 
of evaluative positivity or negativity. 
l4Recall of positive and negative items were scored separately 
because it was felt that the positivity or negativity of the items might 
differentially influence recall abilities. 
APPENDIX A 
Examples of Consistently and Inconsistently 
either Positive or Negative Behavioral Sets 
Consistently positive behaviors: 
John gave Gary a present. 
John shared his toys with Joe. 
John gave Ken a ride on his bicycle. 
Inconsistently positive behaviors followed by a negative behavior: 
John hugged Tim. 
John gave a cookie to Fred. 
John hit Ken's arm. 
Consistently negative behaviors: 
John called Paul a bad name. 
John bit Brian's arm. 
John grabbed Jim's toys. 
Inconsistently negative behaviors followed by a positive behavior: 
John tore Fred's picture. 
John threw dirt at Bob. 
John helped Brian clean-up his room. 
Note: Each sequence will be followed by an ambiguous behavior that 
results in either positive or negative consequences (see examples in 
Appendix D). 
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Instructions for Behavioral Prediction Ratings 
After the dispositional ratings had been obtained (see Appendix B), 
the child was questioned to determine whether he could "predict" those 
behaviors that the actor might perform in the future. 
The scale consists of four paired pictures representing either a 
good or bad behavior. The pairs were presented individually and the 
child was asked to point to the picture in that pair that most likely 
characterized the actor's future behaviors. Specifically, the child 
was asked "Which boy do you think John is?". 
\ 
... 
l 
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0 
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APPENDIX D 
Ambiguous Behaviors resulting in . 
either Positive or Negative Consequences 
Positive consequences: 
a) and some friends were in somebody's house. Someone made a 
loud noise scaring away a robber. 
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b) and some friends were outside. Someone kicked a ball on the 
roof, knocking down a hammer that had been lost there. 
c) and some friends were outside. Someone threw a baseball bat 
on the ground scaring away a poisonous snake. 
d) and some friends were outside. Someone ran into somebody 
else, knocking that person out of the way of a speeding car. 
e) and some friends were outside. Someone kicked a ball, scar-
ing away a dog that was about to attack. 
f) and some friends were in somebody's house. Someone threw a 
ball at a shelf, knocking down a toy that had been out of reach. 
g) and some friends were outside. Someone hit a tree knocking 
down a kite that had been caught there. 
Negative consequences: 
a) and some friends were inside. Someone yelled very loudly 
awakening the neighbors. 
b) and some friends were outside. Someone threw the baseball 
bat, hitting another person. 
c) and some friends were outside. Someone ran into someone else 
knocking that person to the ground. 
d) and some friends were outside. Someone kicked the ball 
landing it on the roof out of reach. 
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e) and some friends were outside. Someone ran through the 
• 
flowerbed, breaking some flowers. 
f) and some friends were inside. Someone ran into the table 
breaking some dishes on the floor. 
g) and some friends were outside. Someone threw a baseball, 
breaking a window. 
/ 
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Positive, Negative, and Neutral Behaviqrs 
Positive behaviors: 
a) John gave a cookie to Fred 
b) John shared his lunch with Greg 
c) John helped Bob pick up his toys 
d) John gave Gary a present 
e) John gave Ken a ride on his bicycle 
f) John invited Fred over to his house to play 
g) John shared his toys with Joe 
h) John helped JiD!._ draw a picture 
i) John helped Brian clean up his room 
Negative behaviors: 
a) John tore Fred's picture 
b) John bit Brian's arm 
c) John grabbed Jim's toys 
d) John called Paul a bad name 
e) John poured water on Ken 
f) John pulled Joe's hair 
g) John hit Tim's arm 
h) John threw dirt at Bob 
i) John kicked Gary in the leg 
Neutral behaviors: 
a) John ran past Bob 
b) John spoke to Ken 
c) John stood in line with Paul 
d) John lifted Tim's chair 
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e) John watched Gary play 
f) John looked at Joe's picture 
Note. Names were assigned randomly across all sequences. 
' 
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Scoring Sheet 
A. Do you think 
---
Subject u· 
---
meant to: Sex of subject 
really meant to Sex of experimenter 
sort of meant to Age of subject 
didn't mean to: Piagetian tasks: 
really didn't mean to a) passed __ b) passed __ -
sort of didn't mean to 
/ 
not passed __ not passed 
Items "B" and "C" reversed 
B. Is a "good" or "bad" boy? 
if good: "very, very good" if bad: "very, very bad" 
"good" "bad" 
"a little bit good" "a little bit bad" 
c. Behavior Prediction test: 
D. Do you think __ _ • • • • . • : yes ·_; no 
if yes: Do you think 
---
meant to: 
really meant to 
sort of meant to 
-
didn't mean to: 
really didn't mean to 
sort of didn't mean to 
E. Now see if you can remember the three things that did: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
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Parental Permission Form 
TO: PARENTS OF 1st & 4th GRADE STUDENTS 
FROM: DOROTHY C. BLACK 
ACTING DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH & SPECIAL PROJECTS 
During the week of December 8-12, 60 children in first and fourth 
grades will be participating in a research project investigating ways 
in which children view behavior. The study is under the direction of .. 
a graduate student at Loyola University, Department of Psychology. 
The study will require each child torespond to picture and story 
material individually during a 15-20 minute period. · 
If you are willing for your child to cooperate in this research project, 
please sign this slip and return it to school. 
(Parents' Signature) 
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